

DEATH AND BIRTH OF A CAPITAL CITY IN INDONESIA- DIGITILAZING A NEW CAPITAL

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Moving a capital city never can be considered as a trivial act. Even more when the new city has to be created ex-nihilo. In Indonesia, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) announced on August 16, 2019, his decision to transfer the "Mother City" or "Ibu-Kota" to the island of Kalimantan (Borneo). This highly political decision also covers strategic, economic and social considerations. Delayed for a time by the COVID-19 pandemic, the bill presented to parliament in September 2021 reinvigorates the presidential vision, sets 2024 as the completion date and establishes at 489 trillion Indonesian rupees (approximately 46.31 billion USD) the budget for transfer. The abandonment of Jakarta foreshadows a real reconfiguration of the national territory, for which we will endeavor to study the reasons and analyze the probable consequences.

Keywords: Indonesia; Capital city; Mother-city; Jakarta; Kalimantan; Territorial Development; Economic Intelligence; KALTIM.

INTRODUCTION

« The idea to move the capital city appeared long ago and exists since Sukarno's era. In fact, the idea always comes up during each presidential term, but it has never been decided or discussed in a planned and mature manner. (...) Moving the capital involves great details of planning in choosing a location based on a geopolitical and geostrategic plan including the readiness of funds and infrastructure. But God Willing, I believe if we plan it well, we will accomplish this great idea.»

With these few sentences, Jokowi gave substance, exactly one month after his election for a second and final term, to an ambitious project, unparalleled in the archipelago. At the end of a clever communication process of which Joko Widodo has the secret, where each date is of particular importance, the page of the former colonial capital was about to be turned. In the presidential declaration, the geopolitical and geostrategic aspects are put forward. The decision also follows a logic of domestic policy as it is fully in line with the candidate's roadmap. It thus acts as a second part of the development of the "Outer Provinces"; these forgotten provinces of a growth long centered on the islands of Java and Bali, and to a lesser extent on Sumatra.

In 2016, the President had already initiated the "Ten New Bali" project aiming at making tourism the first source of income unrelated to hydrocarbons. (Fournié and Dou, 2018: 45-46) Foolish bet or wise decision, Joko Widodo will be passed on to posterity as the founding father of a city he only conceives of as "*The best on Earth*"; a real hub of innovation, green industries, the smart city of the 21st century (Jakarta Post, 2019). As a skillful politician, with the experience of a businessman acquired during his early years, Jokowi knows how to give the Indonesian nation directions and challenges. As we were able to measure on the spot, some Indonesians doubt the country's ability to find the required financing. They consider this ambitious project only as a new mean for financial and business circles close to the President to monopolize the wealth associated and the resources of Kalimantan areas, which is

moreover in a hitherto protected environment. For others, he has a long-term vision and enjoys sharing it with his fellow citizens: they deeply believe in the unifying momentum and economic growth that this project can generate.

As a wise man, Joko Widodo, was able to postpone the inauguration of the future capital to the mandate of his successor.

The new “Mother City”, we learned during a speech on the eve of the seventy-fourth anniversary of Independence (August 16, 2019), would be located on the island of Borneo. The three provinces of Central, South and East Kalimantan were entered in the register of possibilities. Ten days later (August 26, 2019), when addressing the nation from the presidential palace, Jokowi announced that a territory of the latter, located at the confluence of the kabupaten of North Penajam Paser and Kartai Kartanegara had been selected.

Numerous displacement of capitals took place over centuries. Never an archipelago as vast, populated and complex as the Indonesia of the 21st century was concerned. Geopolitical, geostrategic, economic, financial, environmental, security, health and social dimensions compete for primacy in this relocation which, obviously, foreshadows a total reconfiguration of the Indonesian territory, an upheaval of economic and power centers, migrations of large-scale populations. A decision probably unthinkable if it had been made by anyone other than a president from Java.

JAKARTA AND THE RING OF FIRE

Located on the Pacific Ring of Fire, Indonesia has more than 400 volcanoes, 129 of which are active. In Java and Sumatra, the high density and harshness of living conditions have led people to live on their side, often assimilating them to deities. Volcanoes have often become places of worship or pilgrimage (Fournié, 2019). Much of the archipelago is subject to earthquakes, the epicenters of which can also be found in the depths of the sea and generate tsunamis. Submersion waves complete the destructive work of the earthquakes. It was the case in Aceh in 2004, Nias in 2005, Palau in 2018 and in the Sunda Strait the same year. In the latter case, the tsunami caused by the eruption of Anak Krakatau (still active in January 2020) killed more than 200 people in the seaside town of Carita on the west coast of Java, just some 110 kilometers away (156 by road) from Jakarta.

The capital has so far been relatively untouched. The archives only report a major episode in 1699 (Griffin, et al. 2018). More recently the events of the Sunda Strait and Anak Krakatau were felt even in the capital and then again in August, November and December 2019. Since October 2018, ten phenomena have impacted the capital in a more or less violent way, the most violent being the Labuan, Banten earthquake of August 2, 2019 of magnitude 6.9 on the Richter scale. (Earthquake-track.com, 2020)

Choosing Kalimantan, the only major island with no active volcano, therefore appears to be a wise decision. Despite government communication and the opinions of many experts, the capital site must however be viewed with caution.

The tremors coming from the volcanic arc of the Celebes Islands can be, although attenuated, felt there. But above all, three major seismic faults exist in the region: Maratua, Mangkalahat

and Paternoster. All three are extremely active and were the source of devastating earthquakes in 1921, 1964, 1982, 1983, 2000, 2006 and 2007.

Table 1 : Major earthquakes in the East Kalimantan region

Date	Location	Earthquake	Tsunami
14/05/1921	Sangkulirang	Yes (Level 7-8)	Yes
16/11/1964	Tanjung Mangkalihat	Yes (5.7)	?
04/06/1982	Kutai Est	Yes (5.1)	?
31/07/1983	Muarabulan -Kutai Est	Yes (5.1)	?
16/06/2000	Mangkalihat	Yes (5.4)	?
31/06/2006	Tanjungredep	Yes (5.4)	?
24/02/2007	Muaralasan	Yes (5.3)	?

Source : (Kompas 2019)

By relocating the capital to the province of East Kalimantan (KALTIM), the risks of destructive earthquakes and tsunami remain. The BMKG (Badan Meteorologi, Klimatologi and Geofisika) is monitoring the area closely.

It will therefore be necessary to learn from the mistakes of the past during the urbanization of Jakarta, to impose high standards of earthquake-resistant construction, to respect the parameters of life imposed by nature. Deforestation, destruction of mangroves, intensive drilling should be prohibited. What will it actually be?

CAPITALE DISPLACEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE PAST

The new city occupies a more central place within the archipelago than Jakarta. We can assume that it will no longer be a coastal city, therefore less subject to marine hazards. The absence of volcanoes is a remarkable asset in a country with so many.

One can rightly wonder about the functions that will be assigned to the new flagship city. Most capitals, although not always the largest cities in the country, beyond attracting men, concentrate political, economic, judicial and cultural powers. We can consider transferring this sum of power to Kalimantan, even as Java, the most populous island, has sought to monopolize them over the centuries and more particularly since independence.

From a strategic point of view, Kalimantan is divided between Indonesia (about two-thirds), Malaysia with the states of Sabah and Sarawak and Brunei. Moving the capital will suppose a restructuring of Indonesian Armed Forces around the giant island and the development of new strategic harbors and Airforce bases. Could, this new situation, revive tensions that have been forgotten since the end of the 1960s, especially if Indonesian demographic pressure is exerted at the borders?

How to justify the abandonment of business and industrial areas of Jakarta in which investments still take place on a daily basis? Even if, the risk of seeing them in a few years being submerged in water, is definitely acknowledged.

Populations are also a problem. It appears unthinkable to transfer all of the inhabitants of DKI Jakarta. But then, who will be the civil servants selected and how will the choices be made between those who remain at risk and those who leave? Families will be separated, individuals will lose their jobs. The management of skills, the restriction of the supply of services should be addressed.

Transferring Jakarta is certainly a huge infrastructure and public works project, but in our opinion a real human project whose inappropriate conduct could lead to chaos.

Indonesia has been deeply shaped by its transmigration programs, among the largest in the world. 3.6 million people were displaced between 1903 and 1990, mainly from Java and Bali to the outer islands. Such a policy had large consequences on the environment, demography, the structure of communities, social balances, local cultures, tribal heritages and of course religious beliefs. On such an occasion, Indonesian people largely demonstrated, and over a long period of time, their capacity for resilience.

In Indonesia more than elsewhere, urban history has been shaped by political power. The new capital must represent "21st century Indonesia" and can only be seen as a "smart, eco-conscious and ubiquitous city". Political power will need both architecturally and symbolically to make it the beacon of the nation. A city symbolizing "unity in diversity": "the Nusantara capital".

Long the de facto capital, Jakarta did not become the "de jure" mother-city until the 1960s. Historically colonial capital, Indonesia's first port, it is above all the political, economic, financial center and the most populous city of Indonesia. The unborn city will not be able to claim any of these titles of nobility.

The reconfiguration of empires, the accession to independence, wars have forced many peoples to adopt new mother cities. More serenely, states have changed capitals for political reasons (United States, Australia, India); demographic (Brazil); geographic (Nigeria, Burma), strategic (Pakistan, Turkey), environmental (Belize) centrality and sometimes by the sole president will (Côte d'Ivoire, Kazakhstan). All of these reasons apply in the case of Indonesia. As we will see later, we could add a desire to develop the territory.

Countries have chosen, by distributing prerogatives and powers, to have several capitals, sometimes up to three. We must then distinguish between administrative, legislative, judicial, economic and seat of government. In the case of Indonesia, all configurations appear possible, although it is unlikely that Jakarta will lose its status as an economic capital in the short term.

Planned as early as 1995, the creation at the initiative of Dr Mahatir Muhammad of the new town of Putrajaya, the administrative capital of Malaysia since 1999, constitutes, even though Kuala Lumpur remains the economic capital, an interesting model. Located just 30 kilometers from Kuala Lumpur, conceived as a smart and environmental city, it spreads over 4,400 ha and hosts 335,000 employees. Putrajaya represented an investment of 8.1 billion USD (The Malaysian Reserve 2019).

Built between 1956 and 1960, under the socialist presidency of Kubitscheck, Brasilia had employed nearly 30,000 workers on a site completed in four years and entirely managed by the state. Planned to accommodate 500,000 inhabitants, it has sixty years later more than 2.8 million residents. The cost of this utopia, which dreamed of being the city of the future,

designed by Oscar Niemeyer and led by town planner Lucio Costa, was estimated at 1.5 billion USD at the time by Eugênio Gudin Fonte, Minister of Finance of President Café Filho or 83 billion dollars in 2010 (Ultimo Segundo 2010). If it has gradually established itself as the capital, Brasilia now has to face traffic jams and, forced to expand, exerts strong pressure on the environment. Social matters, corruption and demographic problems were not sufficiently anticipated. And the expected effects on the regional economy did not materialize. The city remains a rich enclave in a poor region. (da Costa 2010)

Although the geographic area differs, Indonesia's new capital project has many similarities to that of Brasilia. Of course, technologies have evolved, but natural risks (earthquakes, tsunamis) seem higher in Indonesia. The feedback from Brasilia, the disappointments generated, the additional costs that the first project had to face should be carefully studied by Asian developers and town planners.

SYMBOLIC ROLE OF THE MOTHER CITY

Jakarta cannot claim to have hosted famous civilizations as was the case of Trowulung with the Majapahit, of the surroundings of Palembang for the Srivijaya empire, of Bogor for the Pajajaran kingdom. Many other cities of the archipelago, existing (Jogyakarta or Kediri for example) or disappeared (capitals of the Tarumanagara or Saleindra empires), presided over the destinies of Hindu, Buddhist kingdoms or of Muslim sultanates who reigned over all or part of the archipelago. This was never the case for Jakarta or Batavia.

To paraphrase Duby who affirms that "the city was born with the road" one can claim that Jakarta was born with the sail. Or more exactly, from the fierce competition existing between the Portuguese, Spanish, English, Dutch empires and the Muslim sultanates, all engaged in the race for the spices and raw materials of Indochina and India.

"In its current configuration, Indonesia is a result of the Second World War and the process of decolonization" (Fournié and Dou, 2017). Jakarta is above all the capital of the Dutch colonizer and of post-independence Indonesia. The Japanese occupier having seen fit to rename it, the old Batavia lost its name in 1942 in favor of Jakarta (Djakarta until the early 1970s).

This city is symbolically unimportant from either a historical or religious point of view. Worse, it recalls a past of Dutch and French domination. It is different with political and civic symbolism (Claval 1999). Batavia constitutes the silt of the first Indonesian nationalist movement. Made up of intellectuals and members of the aristocratic class, the Budi Utomo, held its founding congress there on May 20, 1908. Claiming access to culture and education for the natives, this movement mainly of Javanese essence, opens a way that will not close again.

On October 27 and 28, 1928, the Sumpah Pemuda, the oath of youth, was also pronounced in Batavia. This text holds a major place in the advent of the country to be born because it broadcasts a notion reserved until then only to intellectual circles: Indonesia. It proclaims, for all the inhabitants of the archipelago, the existence of a common origin, the "Indonesian homeland"; a sense of belonging to the "Indonesian nation"; the aspiration for a common language, Bahasa Indonesia.

Dutch colonial center, Japanese military center, Jakarta has implicitly become a central place of struggle against the oppressor. Jakarta above all symbolizes modern Indonesia struggling against external threats and its internal divisions. It was in Jakarta that the independence of Indonesia (Proklamasi) was proclaimed by Soekarno and Hatta on August 17, 1945. It was in Jakarta again, that the Piagam Jakarta was drawn up and approved on August 22 of the same year, this five-point doctrine which was to serve as the basis for the elaboration of the Pancasila. Finally, it was in Jakarta that the republican government was formed which, at the end of the war, would obtain the allegiance of the princes, rajahs and sultans exercising power in the many islands of the archipelago.

During the Soekarno and Suharto presidencies, Jakarta would represent the unity of Indonesia in the face of the Dutch attacks (Operatie Product of 1947 and Operatie Kraai of December 1948) in the war waged against Malaysia (Konfrontasi between 1963 and 1966); the communist insurrection of September 1948 (also called the Madiun affair), the attempted Islamist sedition between 1949 and 1962 known as Darul Islam, the Moluccas rebellions of 1950, North Celebes (1957), de Padang (1958), and finally to the attempted coup d'etat of General Nasution of 1952. With the coming to power of Suharto and the establishment of the New Order, it remains the power and the sacred place of "a political system based on stability (stabilitas) and unity (persatuan)" (Cayrac-Blanchard 1993, 4)

Until the Asian crisis of 1996-1997, Indonesia presented itself as a hyper-centralized state. Decisions are made in the capital by a small group of people. This control is further reinforced by the predominance of the Javanese in the administration and the armed forces. Suryadinata (2002, 4) even conceives of Indonesian politics as a power struggle between Javanese and non-Javanese. A standoff whose consequences are still being felt in the 21st century.

Although Jakarta concentrated all the powers, only the proclamation by Soekarno on August 17, 1950 of the Republic of Indonesia de facto establishes Jakarta as its capital. The Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia was born. It will take more than ten years for Jakarta to officially become the capital of the country. This will be done through Presidential Decree 1961-2 and Law 1964-10. Called "Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta", the territory took the rank of special capital province. A political decision established Jakarta as the capital of the archipelago. Fifty-five years later a new presidential choice could deprive the city from such a status.

The political power was brought to create in the city various monuments, architectural forms through which "the territorializing synecdoche" could act (Debardieux 1995, 99). The construction between 1961 - the year Jakarta became capital - and 1975 of the Monas obelisk (Monumen Nasional) proceeds from this logic. The statues scattered throughout the capital, the new parliament, the first high buildings (Sarinah in 1963) bear witness to the emergence of a sovereign state. Like them, the Hotel Indonesia, now a national heritage site, and the Gelora Bung Karno Main Stadium with its 110,000 seats, inaugurated in 1962 for the Asian Games, are part of what Debardieux calls "places of condensation",

Under Suharto Jakarta has grown into a modern megalopolis and the undisputed economic, administrative and political center of Indonesia. It is the point of friction between traditional societies and supporters of modernism; the center of gravity of struggles for political

supremacy between traditionalist Muslims (Islam Nusantara) and reformists, the only really audible scene of ethnic and social confrontation.

In 2016 and 2017, demonstrations by opponents - some reportedly brought together more than 250,000 people - in the election of the outgoing governor, the Chinese and Christian Basuki Tjahaja Purnama aka Ahok or BTP, constitute to this day the paroxysmal symptom.

Therefore, the relocation of the capital shall be considered under an alternative angle: the strategy of a democratic power concerned with avoiding the convergence of social, political and religious struggles in the same territory.

The capitals, scrutinized by national and international media, are extraordinary sounding boards. They are therefore likely to become privileged targets for the actions of political or terrorist groups, masters of psychological action and the control of communication channels. Jakarta is no exception to this premise. Since 1999, around fifteen attacks have taken place in the capital affecting symbolic places: Merdeka Square (Independence Square), Bursa Efek (the Jakarta Stock Exchange), the Australian Embassy, the Marriott hotels (several times) and Ritz, Sudirman Avenue. The power of the Bali attacks of 2002 (202 dead) and 2005 (22 dead) and the presence among the victims of many foreigners have partially obscured the recurrence of operations targeting the capital. A territory whose size and density make intelligence and control operations more complex at a time when many jihadists are returning from Iraq and Syria.

Conversely, with the exception of the Samarinda church in 2016, few attacks have affected Kalimantan. However, preventive arrests of suspects increased in 2019. In June, 34 people suspected of belonging to the JAD (Ansharut Daulah Network) group were arrested in Central Kalimantan province. On the Malaysian side, violent attacks and kidnappings for ransom perpetrated by groups suspected of being linked to the Abu Sayyaf (ASG) group are repeated in the waters of East Sabah province and the Sulu Sea.

Since the 1950s and the emergence of Darul Islam, the emergence of a transnational Asian caliphate has been the avowed goal of groups that spread across Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. The creation of a new capital and the symbols it implies is bound to increase the terrorist risk in a region that has remained largely unscathed. Beyond the attributes of power and periods of security uncertainty inherent in the situation newly created by the construction of buildings, the displacement of officials and political elites; the proximity of the infrastructures and oil terminals of Balikpapan and Samarinda, give the area an additional attractiveness for carrying out a bang.

IN THE BOWS OF THE URBAN MONSTER

Jakarta appears as an “urban monster” whose characteristics are particularly complex to identify. The data change from one source to another. To add to the confusion, cities and districts can have the same name. This is the case for Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi. Huge masses of people move in a universe without absolute frontiers composed of DKI Jakarta (the special province of Jakarta) and the districts close to BOgor, TAngerang and BEKasi forming this elusive and shifting region known as JABOTABEK. The addition of DEpok (other peripheral city) creates the new complex known as JABODETABEK.

Table 1 : Jakarta and its periphery : population

Agglomeration	2000	2018	2030
Jakarta	8 390	10 517	12 687
Bogor	751	1 115	1 402
Tangerang	1 326	2 222	2 884
Bekasi	1 622	3 159	4 332
Total	12 089	17 013	21 305

Source : United Nations, World Cities Population, 2018

A study of daily movements carried out by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (BPS- Biro Pusat Statistik) estimates to 29,313,171 the number of people over 5 years of age residing in the territory of JABODETABEK. Among these, 3,259,894 or 11.1% make trips within the territory (98.09%) or outside (1.91%) The percentage varies from one district to another with a maximum for Depok of 19.6% .

Designed to accommodate a population of 600,000 inhabitants, the urban area of Jakarta could well be today with more than 35 million inhabitants the fourth in the world (populationdata.net 2020). The population grew exponentially from 530,000 in 1930, to 2,900,000 in 1961, 4,540,000 in 1971, 6,530,000 in 1980, 7,482,000 in 1985 (United Nations 1989, 1-3), frequently exceeding the most alarmist forecasts of development plans.

The population growth rate (DKI Jakarta) has gradually slowed down from 4.5% over the period 1961-1970 to 1.42% in 2010 and 1.07% in 2018 ([Badan Pusat Statistik Jakarta 2020](#)). The city center (Jakarta Pusat) no longer has the same power of attraction (+ 0.29%) being close to saturation with a density of 19,212 inhabitants / km² slightly lower than that of the west of the city (19 757 inhab / km²). The average density of DKI (15,804 inhabitants / km²) being partially distorted by the attachment of the Pulau Seribu, a sparsely populated archipelago and the disaffection of the North (12,255 inhabitants / km²) which is increasingly subject to flooding.

A few evil fairies leaned over its cradle, the place being famous from the start for its unsanitary conditions. A coastal city located in a delta irrigated by 13 rivers, the place is also subject to monsoons. Between 1733 and the end of the 18th century, 2,000 to 3,000 VOC employees died there annually, mainly Europeans, suffering from various diseases including malaria and tuberculosis. The epidemics then exhausted the reserves of flight, military, administrative or commercial personnel. (van der Brug 1997, 893)

Bordered to the north by the sea, the city gradually spread horizontally to the south, east and west before growing vertically. From a structure of traditional villages (kampung) clustered around the port area, Jakarta has gradually evolved into a modern megalopolis with a gigantic hinterland with elusive contours. New towns, often with large industrial zones and always with shopping areas and centers, have emerged, quickly absorbed into their borders by the capital. In 2017, there were more than 25 exceeding 500 ha for a total of nearly 53,000 hectares. (Hanlon and Vicino 2018)

The development of mass transport is now a major issue. Long neglected for technical (flooding, high density) or budgetary reasons, the construction of urban hubs and multimodal platforms are now fashionable. The delay has been greatly accentuated by the economic and political impact of the Asian crisis. The ongoing deployment of the BRT (Bus Rapid Transport or Trans-Jakarta) and MRT (Jakarta Mass Rapid Transport) lines is therefore primarily concerned with making up for delays over the past thirty years.

Linked to sustained growth, the increase in population has helped make Jakarta "a huge profit center" and an endless sink for opportunities for corruption ("kebocoran") (Server 1996). Any infrastructure project is likely to attract suspicion and envy. (Hanlon and Vicino 2018)

The capital suffers from air and water pollution. Temperatures have also risen by more than two degrees over the past 150 years (Lubis, et al. 2013).

The increase in built-up areas and the scarcity of green or marshy areas have reduced the permeability of soils, precipitating water directly into rivers and causing them to overflow. Deforestation and the "wild" construction of second homes in the surrounding mountainous areas of Bogor and Puncak, with a milder climate than the capital, were aggravating factors.

Accentuated by heavy rains, high tides or a tidal wave, floods hit the city.

Since 1960, Jakarta has been regularly submerged as it was again in 1990, 1995-96, 2002, 2007, 2013 and 2020. If the only district of Grogol was submerged in 1960, this has not been the case since. The events of 2007 (80 deaths), 2013 (47 deaths) and 2020 proved to be particularly destructive. As of January 6, 2020, crisis reports show 3 affected provinces (DKI Jakarta, West Java and Banten), 74 districts and 293 sub-districts, 501,000 people affected including 36,000 displaced and 66 dead (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana 2020) mainly by drowning, electric shock or health reasons. These floods have led to the disruption of trains in the region, greatly disrupted air traffic, impaired the distribution of drinking water and the operation of power plants.

A 2009 study carried out on port cities with high exposure to climatic hazards ranked Jakarta in the top 20 for risks to people but not to property. As of this date, 513,000 people entered the vulnerability zone with a projection of 2,248,000 people by 2070 (Hanson, et al. 2011).

The number of victims is now too large for the authorities to be able, as in the past, to blame the only settlements of the poor, displaced and migrants from other provinces, often installed on the banks of rivers, canals or near them. on the side. Living in high-risk areas, these visible populations are regularly among the first victims. (Texier 2008, 362-364)

It is surprising to note that after having faced serious floods in 1699, 1714, 1854 and 1918, no more major dramas were to be reported until 1990. The effectiveness of the work undertaken by Hendrik van Breen after the events of 1918 and the creation of the flood control canal (Kanal Banjir) is therefore certain. This drilling was not completed until the start of World War II and no additional effort was made for decades despite strong post-independence urban pressure. The maintenance of canals previously dredged on a regular basis has been abandoned. The initiation of the creation of the East Flood Canal from 2002 was only a small-scale plaster. Quoted by Silver (2012), hydrologist Irwin Iskandar of Trisakti University considered that the control system was sized for a city of 2,500 hectares, or less than 4% of the surface of the capital. (Silver 2012)

In times of flooding some gates must be guarded by armed men because the decision to keep them closed or to open them determines which parts of the city will be flooded. This is the case near the presidential palace or in Manggarai. Flooding is no longer just for the poor. Residents of the upscale neighborhoods of Sunter and Kelapa Gading come to blows for the same reasons. Opening or closing the gate to the Sunter River will flood either one. (Caljouw, Nas and Pratiwo 2005, 458)

The 13 rivers that flow into the sea, the Ciliwung River in particular, are loaded during their descent from the mountainous region of Bogor with various forms of pollution of agricultural, industrial or human origin. A study carried out between 2005 and 2006 demonstrated levels of BOD (Biochemical Oxygen Demand) and fecal coliforms 2.5 to 4.8 times higher in Jakarta than those observed upstream. The lack of systematic treatment of the water therefore prevents the use of Ciliwung's resources for human consumption. (Vollmer, et al. 2015, 675) The water table is excessively pumped, leading to the penetration of salt water into shallow aquifers but also into deep reserves. (Kagabu, et al. 2011) The volume of water extracted, multiplied by more than 11 between the end of the 19th century and 1994 (34 Quabs or millions of m³), fell slightly at the time of the Asian crisis (17 Quabs) and has continued to increase since then. (H. Z. Abidin, H. Andreas, et al. 2011) The presence of heavy metals has also been detected. (Onodera, et al. 2008)

These pumpings cause, a phenomenon highlighted since 1926, the collapse of the soil and, by an induced effect, floods, the shaking of buildings, networks and many other types of disaster. (Abidin, et al. 2008), (Abidin, Djaja, et al. 2001) The effect differs depending on the neighborhood, however the most optimistic estimates show 1 to 15 cm / year with in some cases up to 20 -25 cm / year. (Taniguchi and Holman 2010, 127) Sinking is correlated with the rates of pumping and urbanization.

These hazards shake community life. The frenzied individualism in the search for free space and financial gain burdens the sense of responsibility towards others. Everyone, rich or poor, protects himself, takes care of his family and his property without taking into account the implications that his decisions may have on others. The city is no longer a place of welcome, protection and work. Its ailments weigh heavily on the individual. Financial (properties lose their value as soon as they come within the scope of flood zones), economic, health and social implications cannot fail to spill over into politics very quickly. His candidate having lost the election to the post of governor under the pressure of the street, Jokowi has everything to gain by announcing the relocation of the capital and by letting the current governor, Anies Basdewan facing criticism of all kinds. : The inhabitants of Jakarta discovered in the aftermath of the January floods that the financing of the fight against the floods had been preferred an international race of electric cars with a budget of 100 million USD. (Tambun 2020)

Indonesia has recognized the risk posed by climate change, changing sea levels and the collapse of its soils, especially in Jakarta. In the NEEDS report (National Economic Environment and Development Study for Climate Change), the archipelago declared itself "very vulnerable to climate change impacts"

Jakarta is swept away in a disastrous cycle: population growth, rampant urbanization, deforestation of the watershed, soil waterproofing, growing need for water, pumping, soil collapse, rising water levels and extreme events attributable to climate change. At this rate,

most of the city and its infrastructure, including Cengkareng Airport, should be under water within a few decades. Now, flooding can be caused by precipitation or, as in 2017 with a giant wave (King Tide), come from the sea.

The accumulated delay is so important and the actors so divided on the strategies to be adopted that the best wills fail. This was the case with the initiatives proposed by the Dutch under the name of the Dutch Delta Program (DDA). The research institute and consultancy company Deltare highlighted in a 2013 report, a drop in land level between 1974 and 2010 of 4.1 meters north of the city, 2.1 meters in the west, 1.4 meters in the east, 0.25 meters to the south; forecasts that are much more pessimistic than those mentioned above. (Deltare-Subsidence Taskforce 2013) However, if the recommendations of specialists (Restriction of pumping, recharge of aquifers in a natural and artificial way, development of alternative water sources, establishment of centralized water management, improvement of decision-making and management processes, creation of decision-making models and data acquisition, integration of geotechnical aspects in urbanization approaches, development of financing schemes and public-private partnerships, exchanges of experiences and good practices) could appear as obvious, they have remained dead letters. Now, a new project (National Capital Integrated Coastal Development Initiative) is attracting policy interest.

Managed by the Priority Infrastructures Committee (Komite Percepatan Penyediaan Infrastruktur Prioritas) and scheduled to start in 2016, it consists of building in the bay of Jakarta, after having renovated the 30 kilometers of existing dams and built 17 artificial islands, two giant dykes at East and West. These monumental infrastructures will be designed to serve over 32 kilometers of urban tolls between Cilincing / Kalibaru and Bekasi. The megaproject budgeted at 17.8 billion dollars was bound to attract criticism of all kinds, as to finance the project, 2000 ha destined for private activities, are being consolidated. Some see it as a new source of profit and corruption, a risk of indebtedness of the country vis-à-vis abroad (only 20% of the capital will be provided by the government and the municipality), a pretext for the construction of new toll freeways, a major risk for the environment and for the populations of the coast and even for the regions (probably Banten and Bangka Belitung) from which the sand necessary for construction will have to be extracted. Others believe that everything must be done to save Jakarta. (Jakarta Post 2019) Dubbed “No regret measures”, this plan should swallow up the last remains of colonial Batavia and Jakarta from the Soekarno and Suharto periods.

NEW CAPITAL AND TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT

The new capital is expected to be established at the confluence of the kabupaten of North Penajam Paser and Kutai Kartanegara, both belonging to the province of East Kalimantan (KALTIM). Historically sparsely populated until the arrival of ethnic groups from Sarawak and migrants from the archipelago, the region, after a period of Hindu rule, was controlled by several sultanates before being subjugated to the Dutch. An ethnic mix has developed there in which we find indigenous Dayak and Kutai ethnic groups as well as Javanese, Bugis, Malays and from Banjarmasin.

With an area of 129,066 km², the province of East Kalimantan is the fourth largest in Indonesia. The relief is bumpy and alternates between mountains, plateaus and valleys from 0 to 1500 m altitude.

Administratively, the province is divided into several districts or Kabupaten: Paser, Kutai Barat, Kutai Kartanegara, Kutai Timur, Berau, Penajam Paser Utara (PPU), Mahakam Ulu (border with Sarawak), Balikpapan, Samarinda and Bontang.

The population is expected to reach in 2020, 1,805,103 individuals, making KALTIM one of the least populated provinces in Indonesia with a density of less than 14 inhabitants / km². The distribution over the territory is uneven due to the concentration around Tenggarong, the main town of Kutai Kartanegara (381,735 inhabitants), the port towns of Balikpapan (321,515 inhabitants) and Samarinda (428,732 inhabitants) the provincial capital. The PPU kabupaten has only 77,645 inhabitants.

The 2010 census (conducted before the split) showed that residents were 85.68% Muslims, 9.5% Christians, 3.84% Catholics, 0.2% Hindus, 0.5% Buddhists, the remainder corresponding to Chinese and animist rites. The Christian populations are found mainly in the North and the North-West of the province.

The prices of consumer goods, mainly imported from other provinces, are two to three points above the Indonesian average in 2018. A data to be compared with the statistics of the BPS Jakarta which presented in 2016, Kalimantan Timur as the Indonesian province with the highest unemployment rate.

KALTIM is however extremely wealthy and remains one of the major contributors to the entry of foreign currency into Indonesia. It concentrates enormous mining, forestry and hydrocarbon potential. Agribusiness is growing with oil palm plantations as well as various forms of animal husbandry that the government seeks to promote. Agriculture has long been a means of subsistence. Between 2000 and 2018, the province managed to reverse the relationship between exports -mainly oriented to Asian countries - of hydrocarbons and other goods. For the latter, these are mainly raw materials or basic products: Bituminous coal and other coal, bituminous sands, lignite, urea, ammonia.

The region has more than 10 sea or river ports. Bontang is the most important export port in value but not in volume, followed by Samarinda (which handles the highest volumes), Balikpapan and Tanjung Sangatta. On import, Balikpapan captures more than 77% of the traffic.

At the end of 2015, the province had only 3,113 km of mainly class III roads, that is, capable of accommodating vehicles up to 8 tonnes and less than 2.50 m wide. However, strategic projects are planned or underway: Mahakan IV Bridge (220 meters long and 16.9 wide), Balang Island Bridge (1,750 m) as well as the Maloy Batuta Trans Kalimantan Special Economic Zone. KALTIM also has two international airports at Samarinda and Balikpapan and four smaller airports serving the interior and island of Maratua. The most recent, Aji Pangeran Tumenggung Pranoto, better known as Sungai Siring Airport has been operating since May 31, 2018, replacing Temindung Airport. The runway can accommodate large planes and the airport has been sized to accommodate 1.5 million passengers per year. Balikpapan Airport,

Sepinggan Airport was rehabilitated in 1997 and a new terminal created in 2014. With a capacity of nearly 15 million passengers, it is one of the most used airports in Indonesia. The province of East Kalimantan has the largest resources (64,316.24 million tonnes) and reserves (16,834.10 million tonnes) of coal in the archipelago ahead of the province of South Sumatra (respectively 41,949.67 and 10,077.62). (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources 2018) It has also been identified as a potential host site for civilian nuclear power since 2007-2008 (IAEA 2019)

The needs of the new capital have been estimated at 1,196 MW, which is more than the current consumption of the whole island of Borneo. They will require the construction of an additional capacity of 1,555 MW. (Syukra 2019) A need that was not taken into account in the 2019-2028 plan of the national electricity company PLN and cannot be supported by the current network.

The new capital was, from the outset, touted as smart and environmentally conscious. The first characteristic assumes the existence of efficient networks, data centers, cooling units and communications, which consume a lot of energy. A need that environmental groups and media around the world fear will be converted into coal-fired power stations, a resource immediately available in the province.

There are several kinds of reservations about the project. Illegal deforestation by fire, weakening ecosystems and polluting the air, is frequent in the area. In 2015, 3,487 fire starts were detected in the kabupaten of Kutai Kartanegara. (Greenpeace South East Asia 2019) The region is known for its flora and fauna. The construction works risk endangering them or causing them to disappear, just like the culture of the endemic peoples for whom these territories remain sacred.

Finally, the need for cement could lead to the destruction of nearby limestone deposits, known to harbor traces of primitive settlement. The Mangkalihat Karst was the subject of a request for classification from Unesco in January 2015.

CONCLUSION

By choosing to move the capital of the Indonesian archipelago, President Joko Widodo has made a remarkable entry into historical geography: the name of the city to be born will be associated with him forever. Jakarta has only been the mother city for 56 years of an archipelago controlled by various empires and sultanates over the past centuries: the city does not enjoy any sacredness in the hearts of Indonesians. Symbol of independence, it also recalls the Colonial era. Turning the page on Jakarta also means projecting Indonesia into the 21st century and closing the books of Soekarno and Suharto in a country where more than 40% of the population is under 25.

This decision establishes Jokowi as a master of game theory. He applies it to both economics and politics. No one can blame Jokowi for his inaction. As a fine connoisseur of his fellow citizens, he chooses the moment when the province of Jakarta is no longer controlled by his relatives to move the capital while validating the pharaonic project called "No regret measures" All those who will be required to remain in the "Sinking city" will be grateful to him for having attempted this ultimate and costly strategy. It will be the same for investors, Dutch,

Korean or others; construction companies; motorway managers and all stakeholders in public-private partnerships.

He also honors an electoral program geared towards the development of all the provinces of Indonesia. But take care to select one of the largest and richest in the archipelago, still largely untapped. As is Jakarta, one can imagine that Kaltim, a large contributor to the national balance of payments, will have to finance the gigantic works to come. The region has the capacity.

By settling in a sparsely populated province, the government, political bodies distance themselves from the moving masses and from political, social and religious demands.

A vast migratory program will have to be put in place. It should allow the selection of new comers on the model of Putrajaya.

However, the project seems disproportionate and largely under budget, made more complex by archipelagic constraints, distance, logistical aspects, and the virtual absence of local skills. The environment in which the new capital is to be built, the forest, is downright hostile. Of course, there are no volcanoes, but the terrain is seismic, increasing construction standards and costs. The lack of roads and insufficient energy require the prior construction of infrastructure. A fantastic windfall for local and foreign companies.

So how, without betraying commitments to respect the environment, eco-design and ubiquity, design this modern city in a single mandate? Sixty years later, Brasilia looks back on Kubitschek's impatience, planning errors and the enormous financial outlay. A utopia whose effects on the growth of the country and the region have partially remained at the forecast stage.

The construction of the capital, close to the Malaysian border, could revive memories of a bygone era if suddenly demographic pressure was exerted in Sarawak. It is also making it a new target for transnational terrorists who until now viewed Borneo as a fallback and transit zone.

Finally, the huge investments that we foresee in order to bring this project to fruition could lead China, in its Silk Roads strategy, to offer to invest in the area.

Unless the constitution is amended, this term should be the last for President Joko Widodo. Also, the failure of the transfer project could not be his but that of his successors; provided, of course, that he does not, like Kubitschek, persist in wanting to inaugurate the capital before 2024. Definitely, the digitalization of Jakarta will be a live case study.

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