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The Centenary of Poland's Independence. A Note on Infrastructure Convergence

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V6 – comments welcome

« Toute la question du repos de l'Europe est dans la Pologne »

“The issue of the peace of Europe is crucially related to the situation of Poland”

Charles Maurice de Talleyrand – Périgord

« Pendant la conférence [NDLR : dans les années 1934], je ne pus m'empêcher de comparer la diplomatie magistrale de Talleyrand et celle des apprentis sorciers d'aujourd'hui. Talleyrand avait eu le génie d'aller droit au cœur des problèmes et d'ignorer tout ce qui n'était pas essentiel. S'il avait été vivant, je suis sûr qu'il eût pénétré la nature des dictatures et les motifs personnels des dictateurs qui signaient l'arrêt de mort de la liberté »

“During the conference [Editor's Note: in 1934], I could not help but compare Talleyrand's magisterial diplomacy and that of the sorcerer's apprentices today. Talleyrand had the genius to get straight to the heart of the problems and to ignore everything that was not essential. If he had been alive, I am sure he would have had penetrated the nature of the dictatorships and the personal motives of the dictators who signed the death warrant of freedom.”

A. Potocki, *Châtelain en Pologne : mémoires du comte Potocki*, 1961, pp. 210-211.

For a long time, the independence of Poland was one of central issues of a French policy. In the 19th century, at a sad time of Partitions of Poland, after 1815, French ruling circles, in the time of turmoil and revolts in Polish lands, were supporting the uprising and asking Russia, Prussia and Austria to let the Polish people take their place in the Concert of Europe. The Republican supporters – heritage of the time 1789-1799 and after 1871, the Bonapartist party (heritage of 1799-1815 and 1852-1870) but also the Monarchist supporters (1815-1830; 1830-1848) were asking for more freedom in Poland. Jules Michelet is maybe expressing exactly this feeling of the French population at this time period:

“As we have said elsewhere, Europe is not a random assemblage, a simple juxtaposition of nations and people, it is a great harmonic instrument, a lyre of which every nationality constitutes a string and represents a tone. This is not an arbitrary assemblage; each country is necessary on their own and necessary as compared to other countries. To remove even one of them is to distort the whole assemblage, it is to make the array of nations dissonant or silent. (...) Live, Poland, live! The world is begging you, every nation.”

Jules Michelet, *La Pologne Martyr*, E. Dentu, Librairie Editeur, Paris, 1863

During this time period, one example of the support of France for the Polish people was the critics of Napoleon III facing the Polish uprising of 1863 against the Russian domination (Lynn Case M., 1976, p. 390). France and many western countries addressed critics to Russia and Prussia and asked for peaceful solutions. Prussia and Russia signed the Alvensleben convention (8.02.1863) against the insurgents. This convention brought both occupants closer. Russia, however, did not intervene in the Austro-Prussian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870). Napoleon III asked at the beginning of November 1863 for launching a European Congress to solve the Polish issue (Lynn Case M., 1976, p. 390).

When the Nazis attacked Poland and the Free City of Gdańsk in 1939, for example, in Gdańsk (German Danzig), French intellectuals and politicians were clearly remembering this “old alliance” and asking for support, which was the outbreak of WWII. Let’s remember the title of the book of Henri de Montfort (1889-1965), one of the best French specialist of Poland at this time period (he was awarded Officer of the famous *Polonia Restituta*): « Dantzig, Port de Pologne dans le passé et dans le présent », Paris, Editions A. Pedone, 1939. Published just before WWII, the book contains a clear preface of the French Deputy of Ardèche Departement, Gaston Riou, Member of the Commission of the French National Assemblée for Foreign Affairs, asking the Nazis to keep their hands off Gdansk. Henri de Monfort begins his book with the words :

“It was by Gdańsk that I first arrived to Poland. That country had just regained its hard-fought independence. On its narrow Baltic coast, Gdynia was only a fishing village...”

With this description of his first arrival to Poland, Henri de Montfort is referring to the strong support of the French government to the Polish government for building a new Polish port in Gdynia at a time where the port of Gdańsk was under the supervision of international law. Implicitly, he reveals, and the Preface of the Deputy Gaston Riou confirms, that France will not abandon Poland, which was the case in the war declaration of 1939.

Our paper is deliberately modern. Since 1918, apart from the period of the German-Soviet and then German occupation during the Second World War and the satellite status in the Soviet Block (1945-1989), Poland has been among independent European countries. Since 2004, it has been a member of the European Union. Since joining the EU, Poland has been a beneficiary of the European Structural and Investment Funds which aim through co-financing on national, regional or local basis at the improvement of the infrastructure, in terms of both

quantity and quality. As expressed by Petzhold and Heinelt (2018, p. 134), “ the aim of structural funds and the EU cohesion policy can be summarized in the following quotation :

“The Structural Funds aim at reducing regional and social disparities within the EU as well as fostering the competitiveness of regions. Above all, they should contribute to the reduction of differences in regional development. By these means, social and economic cohesion of the whole EU should be achieved. (Kopp-Malek and Lachowska 2011, p. 153 quoted by Petzhold and Heinelt (2018, p. 134).”

The analysis of the existing infrastructure was carried out to show what remains from the previously existing discrepancies in the three former regions of partitioned Poland until now. Can we still see any differences between them? Is the convergence in terms of the transport infrastructure to be seen as rather weak or strong? Does it accelerate or not after the accession to the European Union?

Our research revolves around the road and railway network. In the analysis, we will consider the accessibility of main urban centers (travelling time), the density of railway lines and highways measured as a length of the railway lines per square kilometer and per inhabitant. We will also consider the data concerning the European funds to assess whether the European Regional Policy has reduced the level of infrastructure discrepancies in Poland during the last 15 years.

We will look at the interconnection between the three regions of the 19th century partitions: does the gap in the transport infrastructure still exist? Then we will analyze the amount of regional funds dedicated to Polish infrastructure programs for both road and railway networks, with a regional mapping of the financial flows towards each voivodeship (administrative subdivision of Poland). We will observe the reduction of the disparities inherited from the time of the partitions of Poland. Finally, the practice of closing the minor railway lines will be considered as a part of the policy aiming at the increase of efficiency of the rail network.

Independence of Poland

On the 11th of November 1918, Regency Council handed over the superior authority over the army to Józef Piłsudski (he was appointed the Commander-in-chief of the Polish army) and entrusted him with creating a national government for the restored Polish State. The date of the 11th of November was chosen in the Second Polish Republic as a memorial of regaining actual independence by the Kingdom of Poland (formally the independence was announced on October 7 1918).¹ From this time period until 1921, the rebirth of Poland is connected with bloody wars against Ukrainian nationalists in the South-East, Czechs in the South, the Bolsheviks in the East, Lithuanians in the North and Germans in the West. In Poland, this time period is known as an “Independence war” that included the Great Poland Uprising (1918-1919), the Polish-Ukrainian War (1918-1919), the Sejny Uprising (1919), the Polish-Czechoslovak War (1919), the Silesian Uprisings (1919-1921), the Soviet-Polish War (1919-1921). Poland’s borders have been finally confirmed not earlier than on the 18th of March 1921 (after the Riga Treaty); July 1922 (when the Upper-Silesia Voivodeship officially began to function), after three Silesian Uprisings, the last of which resulted from the German vote manipulation and terrorism² (camouflage of German military personnel in the form of security police, arrivals of plebiscitary migrants, breaking the Treaty of Versailles rules, according to

¹ On the 7th of October 1918, Regency Council announced the independence of Poland, on the 12th of October 1918, Regency Council gained the supremacy over the occupiers’ army.

² T. Hunt Tooley (1988). *German Political Violence and the Border Plebiscite in Upper Silesia, 1919–1921*. Central European History, 21, pp. 56-98.

which votes were to be calculated by municipalities) that occurred during the Upper Silesia plebiscite of 1921; and 1923 (after the international recognition of the Republic of Central Lithuania as Polish territory³).



Source: “Aux armes”, propaganda poster during the Soviet-Polish War, 1920. Exposition “A l’Est, la guerre sans fin 1918 – 1923”, Paris 2018. Translation of the poster: To arms. Join the volunteer Polish army (fighting against the Red Army).

Between 1919 and summer 1921, the French and Allies send a military commission to support the military rebirth of Poland. Under the command of General Paul Henrys, General Maxime Weygand and Captain Charles de Gaulle belongs to this group. In Upper-Silesia, the French-Italian-British inter-allies expeditionary forces try to solve the violent fights between Polish and German soldiers during the Silesian Uprisings until July 1922.

W. Churchill has expressed his great emotion facing the victory of Poland against the Soviet army.

“But in the meantime, a sudden, mysterious and decisive transformation has taken place... Warsaw, like Paris, is saved... The spirit of Poland, that generations of oppression had failed to stifle, inflamed in a supreme effort for national existence. The terror of a glaring weakness, which had walked with so much confidence to bring the world revolution to the West, has receded with the last of the precipitation beyond the Polish borders”.⁴

Nevertheless, the British government was unfavorable towards Poland, especially before the Polish success in the Soviet-Polish War. During the Russian Civil War, France and Great Britain, supported the White Movement who sought to limit Poland's sovereignty. France, however, saw Poland as an ally against Germany and favored the integration of ethnically mixed areas (such as Kashubia, Upper Silesia and parts of Mazuria) into Poland,

³ Cf. K. J. Galas (2009). *General broni Lucjan Żeligowski i jego zasługi dla niepodległej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*. *Niepodległość i Pamięć* 16/1 (29), pp. 197-204.

⁴ W. Churchill, cited by A. Potocki, Polish castellan, 1961, p. 142.

including accepting its possible territorial acquisitions in the east. The United Kingdom, which feared excessive growth of France and its allies, was opposed to this. At the same time, Piłsudski avoided granting support to Whites, who were led by Denikin, despite the pressure from western countries. The Polish-Ukrainian offensive against Kiev caused a mixed impression in France (believing in the restoration of the Great Russia) due to the fact that Piłsudski, according to the French ruling circles, could lead the offensive with a better military effect together with Denikin. The leader of Whites, however, opposed the sovereignty of Ukraine and Eastern Poland.⁵ Equal position of Polish diplomacy regarding parties fighting in the Russian civil war is shown by instructions that Józef Piłsudski gave the Polish diplomat, Michał Stanisław Kossakowski, the following instructions for negotiations with the Bolsheviks (Reds) and Denikin (Whites):

“There is only one thing to say to both Bolsheviks and Denikin – we are a powerhouse, and you are a corpse. In other words, with a soldier's tongue: choke, be afraid, I do not care, unless the interests of Poland are hooked. And if you hook Polish interests, I will beat you. If I do not beat you anywhere and anytime, it's not because you do not want to, but because I do not want to. I disregard, I despise you. You are immersed in the hands of Jews and German cadets, I do not believe you, your human species. Any relations... diplomatic speech cannot be considered, because their basic condition is faith and discretion and you do not deserve the first, you do not know the second, you betray civilization, your own country and one another...”⁶

Czechoslovakia, taking advantage of Poland's difficult political situation in 1919-1920, took up the armed occupation of the region of Zaolzie inhabited by the Polish majority. Soon, responding to the appeal of the Communist International (Comintern), the Czech army blocked any transit of war materials from the West (mainly from France) to Poland. Zaolzie's annexation violated the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles of 1918 concerning the border which was set on the 5th of November 1918 according to the ethnicity.⁷

The fact that Entente's governments were not too favorable towards Poland was illustrated by the political position of Western States at the Spa conference, where the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, unfavorable to the Poles, convinced of the inevitable military victory of the Red Army and the economic benefits of cooperation between Great Britain and Soviet Russia, forced the Polish Prime Minister, Władysław Grabski, to accept the Polish eastern border running on the so-called Curzon line as a Polish-Soviet ceasefire line and to accept the consent of the Council of Ambassadors (without Polish participation) to divide Cieszyn Silesia without a previously ordered plebiscite, state ownership of Vilnius, Eastern Galicia, the constitution of the Free City of Gdańsk and the Polish-Gdańsk treaty.⁸

To explain the difficult political situation of a newly reborn Poland, a historical context should be presented. In this work, however, we will focus on the transport infrastructure as its development or abandonment in the period of partitions of Poland (1795-1918) reflected the occupiers' policy aimed at erasing Poland from the map of the world. The historical description

⁵ T. Kutrzeba, *Wyprawa kijowska*. Gebethner i Wolff, Warsaw 1937, p. 314.

⁶ B. Skaradziński, *Sąd boży*, Świat Książki, Warszawa 1996, p. 105-106.

⁷ Cf. T. Janowicz, *Czesi. Studium historyczno-polityczne. Wojna o Śląsk Cieszyński*, Wydawnictwo Antyk, Komorów 2010.

⁸ An illustration of the position of the Western countries which was unfavorable to Poland with regard to Polish-Soviet relations was the Declaration of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the temporary Eastern border of Poland, signed by Georges Clemenceau - Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on December 8, 1919, establishing the border of the area, where the Polish government has the right to install its own administration on. It was a line later referred to as the Curzon Line, although in fact Lord Curzon was neither the author of the concept nor its supporter. Its author was Lewis Namier (B. Rusin: *Lewis Namier a kwestia „linii Curzona” i kształtowania się polskiej granicy wschodniej po I wojnie światowej*, „Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej”, tom XLVIII, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, 2013, p. 110.).

will be narrowed down to the Prussian partition and based on the letters of Maria Dorota Radziwiłł.

The situation of Polish people in the Prussian partition based on the letters of Maria Dorota Radziwiłł

During the occupation of Poland between 1795 and 1918, the Polish Prince Antoni Radziwiłł (1833-1904) and his wife Princess Radziwiłł, Marie de Castellane (1840-1915), heir from an old and famous French family, had a particular position in the House of King of Prussia, Wilhelm I. Polish Prince, Antoni Radziwiłł, member of the Chamber of Lords of Prussia, was aide de camp and one of the closest advisors of Wilhelm I. Marie de Castellane (Princess Maria Dorota Radziwiłł) was the granddaughter of the famous Duchess of Dino, later Duchess of Żagań in Silesia (German Sagan), one of the most clever European minds of the XIX century. The Princess Radziwiłł was educated in the memory of Talleyrand diplomatic experiences and hold a famous salon in Berlin in the mid-XIXth century. Talleyrand was also the uncle of the Duchess of Dino. Living in Berlin at the time of Wilhelm I and Wilhelm II, she published *Lettres de la princesse Radziwiłł au général de Robilant 1889-1914* (Bologna-Paris 1933-1934) and *Souvenirs de la princesse Radziwiłł (née Castellane) 1840-1873* (Paris 1931). Her diaries described the political and diplomatic situation in Germany and Europe between 1840 and 1914, keeping always an eye on her French origin along with her seeking of a European balance and peace. As all Polish nobles at the Court of Prussia, she was affected by the repression of Polish population during the time of occupation. In the Preface of her memory, the ambassador of France, Jules Cambon (1845-1935; ambassador in Berlin 1907-1914), French academician, wrote a clear survey of the situation: German policy concerning Polish population seems to the world public opinion less violent than that of Russia. In reality, it is cleverer, more subtle and more constant. She was pursuing the Polish people to abandon their language. During the *Kulturkampf*, the French ambassador stated that the police came during a Polish office in Berlin to stop the priest speaking Polish to the new communicants. He pointed out that in the 1880 Prussian Law on Colonization, it was forbidden to Polish farmer to repair their house or to sell it to their relatives. Their aim was to attract German immigrants and force the Polish population to leave.⁹

In the letters of the Princess Radziwiłł to General Robilant (1933), the Princess Radziwiłł mentions the policy of buying land from the occupied Polish region of Prussia by Germans and describes how the Polish have reacted to it. Poles have bought lands for the amount that exceeded by 30 million gold marks the value of the lands that they have sold to the Germans.¹⁰

In a letter to the General de Robilant, the Princess Radziwiłł is mentioning the limitations imposed by the Prussian administration on the use of Polish language in the occupied territory, especially during the Mass and service but also in the education of Polish children. She wrote: “despite all efforts of Prussia, the Prussian Poland refuse to be Germanized”.¹¹

She gives us a clear view on the constraints imposed on the Polish population by the Prussian government:

“We have facilitated in Poland the establishment of German farmers and merchants, but they have rapidly noticed that around them. A compact population would not accept to be penetrated or pushed back by the new elements; they have created the German oasis in the Polish land but the country itself remains unchanging. Prussia will have then one day to change the system because it has chosen the worst from all the possible systems, by applying minority

⁹ M. Radziwiłł, 1931, p. 24.

¹⁰ M. Radziwiłł, 1933, p. 17, Tome 3, 1902-1907.

¹¹ M. Radziwiłł, August 1905, p. 173, tome 3.

discrimination laws which forbid the Poles to establish in the same way than the citizens of the Kingdom”.¹²

During this time period (August 1905), a severe speech of the Emperor Wilhelm II was held in Gniezno (German Gnesen) on 10 August, where he recommended the “germanization of the country, declaring that Germany means “civilization”. He spoke about the freedom of religion recalling that Pope Leon XIII had promised him the fidelity of his Polish subjects and that it would be very sad if the Polish Catholics had failed to keep their promise. (Radziwiłł, note 1, p. 173).

The Princess Radziwiłł, Polish-French Princess at the Court of the German Empire, expressed her criticism concerning this speech. She states that the Emperor spoke about equality of rights for German citizens but, without a doubt, the principle of equality is not observed in practice. Germanization policy cannot be successful since Poles will submit to the German regime only if they really feel equal subjects with the Prussians. Regarding the promise of fidelity done by Pope Leon XIII, in the name of the German Catholics, it is surely outdated and the Emperor referred to it in a wrong way.

“Besides, if the Polish people from the Province of Posen were unhappy, they would not rebel and do nothing against the law. So the continuing reproach of the Emperor (that the Poles do not like the Germans, that they forget neither their language nor their history) can do nothing good. In a certain period of time, his reproach might have terrible results for the Prussians. Nothing is more dangerous than treating his own subjects as enemies, especially when they are not hostile.”

In 1905, for instance, the state of emergency was declared in the Polish provinces occupied by the German Empire.¹³

The tensions were particularly strong in 1906, during the nomination of a new primate of Poland after the death of archbishop Florian Stablewski in Poznań. The Princess Radziwiłł wrote: “Now, what will the German government do? But primarily, who will be the German ecclesiastic that will accept such a position? And secondly, the Polish people and the clergy of the country will never accept a German primate and if the government had imposed it, citizens of Province of Posen would have revolted.”¹⁴

The Radziwiłł princess stated that the Polish Deputies in the Austrian Parliament have highly protested against the treatment of their fellow countrymen under the Prussian authority. The protest irritated the German government which rapidly asked for an explanation from Vienna, where one should not offend the Poles because they constituted the majority of the Government in the Chambers at that time.¹⁵

In 1907, expropriation laws against the Polish people have provoked a huge debate in the Chamber of Deputies of Prussia. At that time, the new expropriation law was supported by Bernhard von Bülow, Chancellor of Prussia.¹⁶

It is worth mentioning that the policy of other occupants towards the Poles was even worse than the Prussian policy, especially in the Russian partition.¹⁷ In the Austrian partition, after the merger of the Empire of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary (1867), Galicia received a wider autonomy than before. Despite gaining a lot of freedom in governing the province, repolonization of administration and changes in education, Galicia was treated like a colony, on which the administrative authorities imposed ruining taxes which led to a led to hunger

¹² M. Radziwiłł, August 1905, p. 173, tome 3.

¹³ M. Radziwiłł, in a letter from Łańcut, 24-25 December 1905, Paris 1933, p. 207.

¹⁴ M. Radziwiłł, in the letter of 29-30 November 1906, Paris 1933, p. 264.

¹⁵ M. Radziwiłł, letter from 1 December 1907, Paris 1933, p. 322.

¹⁶ M. Radziwiłł, letter from 1 December 1907, Paris 1933, p. 321.

¹⁷ Russian terror is even shown in one of the letters of Maria Dorota Radziwiłł, in a description of a battle of the January Uprising where the Russian army killed the majority of insurgents.

killing up to 50,000 people a year in the second half of the 19th century.¹⁸ In the next section we will focus on the transport infrastructure development in the period of partitions.

Development of road and rail infrastructure in the period of partitions (1795-1918)

In the 18th century, the Commonwealth of Both Nations (Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth) was a phenomenon on a European scale. For almost 300 years power had been in the hands of the nobility represented by the Sejm (lower house of the Polish parliament) – the nobility (citizens) elected the king. From the mid-17th century, after wars that devastated the country and its resources¹⁹, the country was in deep crisis, the nobility refused to sacrifice themselves for their motherland, they dissolved each sitting of the Sejm and there was a shortage of money to maintain the army. The Republic was weakened by incessant wars and could not resist the neighbouring Empires (absolute monarchies). In the three partitions that followed (1772, 1793 and 1795), Russia, Prussia and Austria brought about the elimination of the only republic in this part of the continent. Despite the attempt to introduce reform, the modern Polish Constitution of the 3rd of May 1791 and the Kościuszko Uprising of 1794, the Republic could not be saved. In the Europe of the age, partitions were an unprecedented act of aggression – occupants effected the total liquidation of a neighbouring country, dividing its vast territory amongst themselves. Foreign border posts appeared on Polish soil immediately after the First Partition. Bearing the coats of arms of the aggressor states, new border posts became symbols of Poland's enslavement for over a century.²⁰

The borders that divided Polish lands during 123 years of captivity were not only of great importance in the history of Poland, but had also a vast European dimension. Of particular note here is the Russo-Prussian frontier dividing, among others, the regions of Kuyavia, Greater Poland²¹, and Upper Silesia. It was not only an international frontier, but also a frontier of the civilization. It divided Prussia – one of the most modern countries in Europe at the time and Russia which was powerful but backward compared to the countries of Western Europe.²² The situation in the Austrian partition was hardly better than in Russia. The region of Galicia was neglected by the Viennese authorities²³ and, consequently, economically underdeveloped as

¹⁸ Cf. S. Szczepanowski: *The Poverty of Galicia in Numbers and a Programme for the Energetic Dynamic Development of National Farmsteads*, 1888.

¹⁹ Wars against the Ottoman Empire (1620-1621, 1627-1699), the Swedish Empire (1600-1611, 1617-1618, 1621-1626, 1626-1629, 1655-1660), the Russian Empire (the Moscow War: 1609–1618, the Smoleńsk War: 1632-1634, the Ukrainian War: 1654-1667), against Cossaks (The Khmelnytsky Uprising: 1648-1657, Polish–Cossack–Tatar War: 1666-1671).

²⁰ Emigration Museum in Gdynia; a part of the exhibition concerning the historical context of the Great Emigration, which was directly caused by the defeat of the November Uprising (1830–1831) that followed the Partitions and breaking the provisions of the Kingdom of Poland's Constitution of 1815 by Russian Tsars.

²¹ Greater Poland was incorporated into Prussia after 1795, but subsequent events divided it into two parts. The success of the 1806 Greater Poland Uprising initiated by General Dąbrowski and ended with Napoleon's victory in the Battle of Friedland on June 15, 1807, led to the establishment of the Duchy of Warsaw with the territory covering roughly the lands of a second and third Prussian partition. The Duchy of Warsaw was for 8 years a ersatz of a free country under the control of France. However, after the Vienna Congress, the Greater Poland region was divided for the next 103 years. The Vienna Congress is also called a fourth partition of Poland because its principle of legitimacy has undermined the right of the Polish nation to self-determination concerning its destiny. (<https://kurierhistoryczny.pl/artykul/ile-bylo-iv-rozbiorow-polski,469>).

²² W. Molik: *Granica prusko-rosyjska w okresie zaborów w Wielkopolsce. Przegląd problematyki badawczej*, p. 12. http://www.echo.nazwa.pl/data/modules/zdjecia/obr_granica_2.pdf.

²³ Galicia was a very poor peripheral area of the Habsburg Empire, with a traditional monoculture farming, almost entirely devoid of branches of other economic sectors, infrastructure, etc. The high taxes and the course of enfranchisement of peasants in 1848, as a result of which small farms were created, led to hunger killing up to 50,000 people a year in the second half of the 19th century. In *The Poverty of Galicia in Numbers and a Programme for the Energetic Dynamic Development of National Farmsteads* (1888) the author, S. Szczepanowski describes Galician poverty trap in these words: "A Galician does not work much because he eats too little, he eats

compared to other Polish lands. A huge wave of seasonal Galician emigration to Prussia and transatlantic permanent emigration was not accidental.²⁴ This huge contrast of socio-economic development between the Prussian partition and the Russian and Austrian partitions had to leave a lasting impact. This is why, it remains certainly much more from a fragmentation of the Polish territory than vestiges of the border posts (earth embankments located along the old border) such as those along the Tażyna River near Toruń.²⁵ Before presenting the differences that have remained to this day, it is necessary to present the more detailed conditions of the transport infrastructure development of the 19th century. The analysis of Poland's inland waterway transport will be ignored because its importance is increasingly marginalized in modern times. In addition, the development of navigable waterways is insufficient and the provision of freight by water in total freight transport decreased from 0.8% to 0.3% between 2000 and 2017.²⁶ At the same time, only about 1% of the value of the expenditures needed to restore the appropriate parameters of the Polish waterways is paid annually.²⁷

The differences between the regions occupied by Prussia, Russia and Austria-Hungary became more and more visible in the transport infrastructure during the nineteenth century. In 1815, in the Prussian part of Greater Poland, there were hardly any paved roads. However, in the 1820s the Prussian authorities started to build roads, but firstly the roads connecting Polish lands with Berlin and Wrocław, because the Prussian administration's priority was to integrate the occupied Polish territories as quickly as possible with other provinces of the Hohenzollern Monarchy. It was only later that an asphalt road to Poznań was built. This road crossed cities of Kostrzyn, Września, Strzałkowo and had its end at the border with the Kingdom of Poland. In this kingdom, a route from Warsaw to Kalisz via Łowicz and Koło with an embranchment going to the border town of Słupca was built between 1820 and 1829. Nevertheless, the route from Warsaw to Poznań was difficult, time consuming and expensive (including the costs of a strict passport policy of occupants).²⁸

Even as late as in the second half of the 1860s, the Austrian road network consisted of roads paved in the old Polish period and imperial inns built shortly after the first partition of Poland. The construction of the latter was initiated by the Vienna authorities, who wanted to integrate these lands considered peripheral to the rest of the monarchy.²⁹

In the Prussian partition, travel conditions improved slightly owing to the development of the Poznań rail network in the second half of the 19th century. This network has been extended since 1848, but still in the directions of the great cities of the Hohenzollern monarchy: Szczecin, Berlin, Wrocław, Bydgoszcz, Königsberg, etc. Among the large cities along the border, the following cities have been successively included in this network: Inowrocław and

badly because he works too little and he dies early because he eats badly. In addition, a natural consequence of this short-lived existence is a larger percentage of people in need of care in relation to the adult population, unlike other countries. Since, of all the countries of the moderate zone, Galicia has the largest agricultural population per kilometre, with each farmer yielding the smallest amount of crops, there's no country in the entire globe in which people would eat more badly."

²⁴ K. Broński: *Rozwój pośrednictwa pracy w Galicji na przełomie XIX i XX w.*, Zeszyty Naukowe nr 692, Akademia Ekonomiczna w Krakowie, 2005, p. 5-8.

²⁵ *O t. z. zastoisku toruńskim (Sur le présumé lac de barrage glaciaire de Toruń)*, S. Lencewicz. „Przegląd geograficzny (Revue polonaise de Géographie)”, tom IV., 1923, p.106.

²⁶ Transport wodny śródlądowy w Polsce w 2017 r., GUS, https://stat.gov.pl/files/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultaktualnosci/5511/4/8/1/transport_wodny_srodladowy_w_polsce_w_2017.pdf.

²⁷ In 2012, only 160 million zlotys were spent out of 14 billion zlotys needed to restore the proper parameters of the waterways (K. Świerczewska-Pietras. *Stan i ekonomiczne perspektywy rozwoju transportu śródlądowego w układach przestrzennych ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem rewitalizacji drogi wodnej E40*, „Prace Komisji Geografii Przemysłu Polskiego Towarzystwa Geograficznego”, 32 (1), 2018, p. 46).

²⁸ W. Molik: *Granica prusko-rosyjska...*, p. 116.

²⁹ D. Opaliński, *Dyszlem i pod parą, czyli o galicyjskim kolejowo-pocztowym rozkładzie jazdy z 1867 r.*, „Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej”, R. 62, Nr 4, 2014, p. 613-614.

Kępno (1872), Ostrów (1875), Września (1887), Strzelno (1892). Then, in some of these cities, lines of lesser importance were built near the border: from Kępno to Podzamcze (1872), Września to Strzałkowo (1888) and to Skalmierzyce (1895).³⁰ In the Kingdom of Poland (the Russian partition), although the famous Warsaw-Vienna railway was put into service in 1845-1848, the development of the railway network was much slower. In the Russian partition, the actions of the authorities also aimed at integrating the occupied territories with other areas of the monarchy (Romanov Empire), especially in the territories of the first and second Russian partitions. For example, the railways of Wilno and Nowogródek regions were designed to connect Warsaw with major Russian cities, often avoiding important cities in these regions.³¹

An improvement of a state of transport infrastructure in the Austrian partition remained a minor issue in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In comparison with other parts of Europe and the Habsburg monarchy, the railway projects in Galicia were very modest. Galicia remained at the bottom of the statistics in terms of the density of railway routes per square kilometer, as well as in terms of line length per 10,000 inhabitants.³²

Until 1867, the railway network of Galicia consisted of a main track connecting Kraków with Lwów (length of 342 km), built in 1856-1861, and the section Kraków-Szczakowa (1847). The latter was connected with the Trzebinia-Oświęcim-Dziedzice link road of 46 km (1856), thanks to which Galicia maintained the connection with Vienna. In 1866, the Lwów-Czerniowce line was opened (266.5 km). Furthermore, the railway network of Galicia at that time was complemented by two access lines: Bieżanów-Wieliczka (5 km) and Podłęże-Niepołomice (5 km), finished respectively in 1857 and 1858. However, the total length of all roads within the partition boundaries in 1867 were slightly over 700 km (a relatively poor result).³³


³⁰ W. Molik, *Granica prusko-rosyjska...*, p. 116.

³¹ E. Kirwiel, *Gospodarka Kresów Północno-Wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej: Uwarunkowania rozwoju, reformy ekonomiczne*.

³² D. Opaliński, *Dyszlem i pod parą, czyli o galicyjskim kolejowo-pocztowym rozkładzie jazdy z 1867 r.*, „Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej”, R. 62, Nr 4, 2014, p. 614.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 613-614.

Map 1: Development of the railway network in Polish lands in the 19th century.



Source: *Mapa Rozwój sieci kolejowej na ziemiach polskich w XIX wieku*, G. Szelałowska, *Historia. Dzieje nowożytnie i najnowsze 1870 – 1939*, Warsaw 1994, p. 101.

What remains of the partitions of Poland?

Each of the three occupiers has prioritized in its policy the integration of Polish territory with the rest of the country by developing connections between the capital of the country and the main cities of each partition rather than facilitation of the transport of persons and economic exchange between cities of average importance. Has this hundred-year-old striving of maximum possible disruption of Poland had an impact that remains visible today? A historical perspective of the twentieth century and a comparison of the transport infrastructure of modern Poland will be presented using selected inequality indicators to show the differences in the quality of road and rail infrastructure and the efficiency of road links between the capital (Warsaw) and the major cities of Poland in its current borders.

Second Polish Republic (1918-1939)

After the First World War, the Second Republic, which had just been reborn, had to adapt the transport infrastructure to the needs of the newly reborn state. The system of main road and rail lines was latitudinal, which was related to the needs of economic exchanges within the German Reich and the Russian Empire. The routes taken by the invaders did not constitute a uniform system and, as in the case of the railways, there was no direct connection between the major cities in the country.

Moreover, losses after the First World War were tremendous compared to other countries of the world, which is related to the fact that in the period of 1914-1915, Galicia and the Vistula

Land³⁴ became the main theater of military operations. In Volhynia, the main front lasted until 1916-1917. Once again, Polish central lands became the scene of military operations between 1919 and 1920. Fronts swept across Polish lands which resulted in significant damage of transport infrastructure. The magnitude of the destruction is illustrated by the fact that losses of Polish soldiers fighting on different fronts amounted to 500,000 in the years 1914-1921 (including 100,000 in the battles after the regaining of independence³⁵), which represents the greatest loss in the world in relation to the total population³⁶ (as in the case of all human casualties divided by the number of pre-war population during the Second World War³⁷). For this reason, after regaining independence, and after subsequent wars lasting until 1921, the authorities initially focused on the elimination of war damage and the provision of temporary troubleshooting. It was not until 1922 that new constructions in the road and rail transport were initiated. Until 1938, the new roads were mainly built only to complement the local network, no new long-haul roads were built and highways remained at the initial design stage.³⁸ When it comes to railways, the Polish Coal Trunk-Line was built in 1926-1933. It was the largest and most modern investment in the transport infrastructure of the Second Polish Republic and an example of Franco-Polish economic cooperation – finished after 1931 owing to the French-Polish Rail Association. This trunk-line quickly connected Upper Silesia and the interior of the country with the Baltic coast – the new port of Gdynia.³⁹

Second World War and the Stalinist Period (1939-1956)

During the years of the Second World War, the deportation and expropriation, the destruction, as well as the death and emigration of the pre-war landowners (Germans and Soviets) undermined the foundations of the previous system. What is more, the management system imposed by force by the USSR has led to permanent changes. As a result of the nationalization of industry and banks, the vast majority of domestic assets outside agriculture have fallen into the hands of the state, and the market regulation system has been transformed into a command and distribution system. This strongly influenced the infrastructure projects – they were centrally planned.⁴⁰

³⁴ To punish the Poles for the January Uprising of 1863-1864 (apart from increased repression, massacres of the population, deportation to Siberia, forced labor, confiscation of property and Russification), in 1868, the territories of the Kingdom of Congress were purely incorporated as the province of the Russian Empire, under the name of "Vistula Land" (J. Załączny, *Powstanie styczniowe 1863-1864. Wydarzenia, konsekwencje, pamięć.*, p.10-18, <http://zeslaniec.pl/55/Zalaczny.pdf>).

³⁵ The Greater Poland Uprising (1918-1919), the Polish-Ukrainian War (1918-1919), the Sejny Uprising (1919), the Polish-Czechoslovak War (1919), the Silesian Uprisings (1919-1921), the Soviet-Polish War (1919-1921).

³⁶ N. Mougél, *World War I casualties*, "REPERES – module 1 - 0 - explanatory notes", CVCE, Centre européen Robert Schuman, 2011, <http://www.centre-robert-schuman.org/userfiles/files/REPERES%20%E2%80%93%20module%201-1-0-%20-%20explanatory%20notes%20%E2%80%93%20World%20War%20I%20casualties%20%E2%80%93%20EN.pdf>; A. Jezierski, *Historia Polski w liczbach. Ludność. Terytorium*, GUS, Warszawa 1994, p. 117-119, http://mbc.cyfrowemazowsze.pl/Content/18436/Historia%20Polski%20w%20Liczbach_1994%20198147.pdf.

³⁷ 1939–1945 Pro Memoria - Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2018, p. 12-14, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiq6dDNg8_fAhXrp4sKHZoVCf0QFjAFegQICRAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fstat.gov.pl%2Fdownload%2Fgfx%2Fportalinformacyjny%2Fpl%2Fdefaultaktualnosci%2F5501%2F19%2F1%2F1%2Fpromemoria.pdf&usq=AOvVaw2plevuXnm7islJ0ixIs81K; "The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects." Population Index, vol. 12, no. 3, 1946, p. 163–167. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2730237.


³⁸ J. Kaliński, *Motoryzacja a infrastruktura drogowa w Polsce po 1918 roku*, SGH, 2014, p. 137-138.

³⁹ I. Pecyna, *Magistrala węglowa w regionie szadzkowskim*, „Biuletyn Szadzkowski”, tom 16, 2016, p. 258-259, <http://biuletynszadzkowski.geo.uni.lodz.pl/uploads/art/2016/I.Pecyna.pdf>.

⁴⁰ W. Roszkowski, *Przekształcenia społeczne i gospodarcze W Polsce w latach 1944–1989*, „Polski wiek XX”, nr 6, 2010, p. 83.

The destruction of the Second World War on Polish lands was greater than that of the First World War, and the precise calculation of damage is even more difficult. In 1947, the Office of War Compensation of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers estimated that the losses of the Polish economy in 1939-1945 amounted to about 259 billion of 1927 zlotys, which is 13 times more than the national income of 1938. It should be noted that this estimation did not include the losses resulting from the destruction, disassembly and looting of the lands of the new Poland by the USSR army and authorities.⁴¹

In addition to imposing the dictatorship of Soviet obedience, another problem hindering the integration of infrastructure was the fact that as a consequence of the conferences of Tehran (1943) and Yalta (1945), Polish borders were completely new compared to those before the war. They were moved westward so that the USSR could keep the Polish territories obtained by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939. As a result, Poland obtained a well-developed road and rail infrastructure in the West, including sections of old German motorways. Consequently, despite the fact that Poland lost the least developed voivodeships to the USSR, internal gap of transport infrastructure development between the western and eastern regions persisted after the war (see: the map of the 1946 railway network⁴²). For example, in 1945, in the Wrocław Voivodeship, there were 55 km of paved roads per 100 km² and an analogous rate in the Lublin Voivodeship amounted to only 13.1 km. For this reason, in the 1940s, the authorities focused on eliminating infrastructural damage (such as rebuilding bridges which was often a temporary remedy).⁴³



Map 2: Map of the railway network of 1946.

Polish People's Republic (1945-1989)

In the second half of the 1950s, due to economic difficulties, road investments declined and the quality of roads deteriorated. A significant increase in the number of new roads took place in the 1960s. Investments were mainly made in the voivodeships of the East and South to reduce inequalities. Since the beginning of the 1970s, under the pressure of increasing motorization, the authorities have started the construction of expressways with parameters similar to highways. The longest route of this type, built at the time, was the Warsaw-Katowice route. Nevertheless, the significant increase in the road network has been accompanied by minimal improvements in a road quality. Expressways were built in small numbers, the highway construction program was very slow, the construction of peripheral roads and the construction of bridges were neglected. The period of the communist regime was marked by the preferences of road infrastructures related to the industrialization of the country and the creation of new urban agglomerations. This reflected the direction of the central management policy of the pro-Soviet government that was not based on economic calculation, but favored heavy industry.⁴⁴ This policy, exercised through multi-year central economic plans, has

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 83-84.

⁴² M. Falkowski, M. Pytel, *Analiza geopolityczna aktualnego stanu sieci kolejowej w Polsce*, „Przegląd Geopolityczny”, tom 9, 2014, p. 78.

⁴³ J. Kaliński, *Motoryzacja a infrastruktura drogowa w Polsce po 1918 roku*, SGH, 2014, p. 142.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 142-147.

overshadowed the economic reality of the country. The socio-economic crisis of the 1980s and the introduction of martial law in 1981 by General W. Jaruzelski contributed to the fact that the real major structural problems of the post-war Polish economy have not been addressed throughout the period of communist regime.⁴⁵

Similarly, rail transport was ineffective until the end of the communist rule.⁴⁶ However, it is worth mentioning that the largest investment made by PKP (Polish State Railways) in the post-war period was CMK (the Central Rail Line). CMK, built between 1971 and 1977, was 224 kilometers long and connected the Silesia with Warsaw. Another important achievement at the time of the Polish People's Republic was the construction of a 394-kilometer-long, broad-gauge non-electrified track, now called LHS (Metallurgical and Sulfur Line). Built in the period of 1976-1979, LHS connected the Hrubieszów railway border with the Sławków Południowy station to transport the iron ore from Krzywy Róg directly to the Katowice Steelworks.⁴⁷

Third Polish Republic (from 1989) – Road transport

As a result of elections of June 1989 (partly democratic), Poland became the first country of the Eastern Bloc in which representatives of the democratic opposition gained a real influence on the exercise of power. Solidarity won all but one seat in the entirely freely contested Senate (upper house of the Polish Parliament) and all of the freely contested seats in the Sejm (lower house of the Polish parliament – more powerful than Senate).⁴⁸ Political and economic systemic transformations brought about a huge change in the development and management of the transport infrastructure.

The aforementioned neglect of highway development investments and automobile routes indicates that remnants of infrastructural differences dating back to the 19th century can be seen in the analysis of the density of these roads, even though they did not exist at the time, as infrastructure development occurs on an ongoing basis. Maps presented below compare the density of motorways and two-lane expressways in the years 2001, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014 and 2017 in the voivodeships (the territories marked in blue are characterized by a higher density of these roads and those marked in orange - by a lower density). The denominator is a

⁴⁵ W. Roszkowski, *Przekształcenia społeczne i gospodarcze W Polsce w latach 1944–1989*, „Polski wiek XX”, nr 6, 2010, p. 100.

⁴⁶ J. Kaliński, *Motoryzacja a infrastruktura drogowa w Polsce po 1918 roku*, SGH, 2014, p. 147.


⁴⁷ Despite the fact that all other significant Polish railway lines are standard-gauge, not broad-gauge (*Inwestycje PRL*, Urząd Transportu Kolejowego, http://www.kolejnictwo-polskie.pl/default_321.html).

⁴⁸ Partly free elections were a consequence of preceding bloody suppressed general strikes, opposing the terror of the authoritarian regime, such as Poznań June 1956, March 1968 (Student March), Massacre on the Coast 1970 (December 1970), June 1976, and a result of a creation of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity”. This trade union was established on the basis of numerous strike committees by Lech Wałęsa, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983. Wałęsa was the first President of Poland, elected after the Second World War in free elections. In 1990, he received the insignia of state authority of the Second Republic of Poland from the last President of Poland in exile, Ryszard Kaczorowski. A path to a state’s democratization and sovereignty (independence from USSR) was not disrupted by the martial law introduced by the communist authorities, during which the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” was banned, and its leaders, including Wałęsa, were interned and placed in security-guarded centers. Poland was a pioneer country in breaking out of the Eastern Bloc, as well as breaking out of the closed circle of deficits and hyperinflation (the first Balcerowicz Plan), in which Poland found itself due to the communist rule, and stopping the negative effects of political transformation in the form of financial and economic crisis (the second Balcerowicz Plan). Balcerowicz Plan was a method for rapidly transitioning from an economy based on state ownership and central planning, to a capitalist market economy. It enabled Polish society to carry out effective economic reforms that were closely related to reforming the state administration. Political and economic systemic transformations were conducive to reforming the political system. The events initiated in Poland paved the way for other countries of the Eastern Bloc to break free from the communist rule. Cf. T. Maresz, „Jesień Narodów” – rozpad bloku komunistycznego w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w szkolnej edukacji historycznej we współczesnej Polsce, *Res Gestae. Czasopismo historyczne* 2016 (3), pp. 252-271.

number of the population of each voivodeship. The maps were developed using data from the Statistics Poland (GUS). Especially the maps of the years 2008, 2011 and 2014 reveal the boundaries of the old partitions (before 2008 the length of highways and expressways in almost all voivodeships was marginal). The last card indicates that the differences have decreased.

Simultaneously, maps show the dynamic development of motorways and automobile roads in absolute terms. In 2001, 13 out of 16 voivodeships had less than 0.25 km per 10,000 inhabitants. However, by 2017, all voivodeships exceeded 0.4 km and 7 voivodeships exceeded 0.9 km of motorways and expressways per 10,000 inhabitants.

Figure 1: Density of highways and expressways.



Source: own elaboration based on the data obtained from Statistics Poland (GUS).


Third Polish Republic (from 1989) – Railway transport

As could be seen from the 1946 railway map, a railway network clearly reflected boundaries of the partitions, despite the construction of the Coal Trunk-Line. Bearing in mind the aforementioned description of the achievements of railway projects of socialist times, it seems that the construction of lines of CMK and LHS did not flatten the huge inequalities of the railway infrastructure either. Maps on the figure 2 show the values of a synthetic coefficient of railway network density in the years 1999, 2005, 2011, 2017 (the dark green color indicates a higher density of the railway network and the light green color shows regions of relatively low density). The denominator of this coefficient is a weighted sum of two variables: 1000

inhabitants (with weight 0.6) and 1 km² (with weight 0.4). All data needed to calculate this coefficient were obtained from the Statistics Poland (GUS).

The railway network density maps show the boundaries of the partitions, but also the loss of importance of this means of transport. Even though the inequalities have slightly decreased, this has only happened because of the reduction in the total length of the railway lines in operation. At the national level, this length decreased from 21,073 km to 19,132 km during the period of 2002-2017. In the case of electrified lines, there was a decrease as well (from 12,207 km to 11,874 km) during the same period.

Figure 2: Density of the rail network.



Source: own elaboration based on the data obtained from Statistics Poland (GUS).

Efficiency of road links between Warsaw and different regions

The following map illustrates one of the road infrastructure quality measures. It also shows the degree of integration of the capital (Warsaw) with the rest of Poland. Areas of the ancient partitions (the boundaries of the years 1815-1914) were marked in blue, green and yellow.⁴⁹ These are respectively the Prussian, Russian and Austrian partitions. The large circles represent capitals of the present voivodeships. Smaller circles are the capitals of the old voivodeships that existed until 1998. A black circle represents Warsaw. The colors of the other circles indicate the value of the coefficient showing the efficiency of the road connection of a given city with the capital – the brighter the color, the more effective the link is. These coefficients were obtained by dividing the distance between a city and Warsaw by the average car trip time around 15:00 pm using the googlemaps.com website.

⁴⁹ Bearing in mind that after the failure of January Uprising the institutional autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland was completely abolished (1866-1867) and the kingdom was transformed into Vistula Land – that is why the eastern border of the Kingdom of Poland, which did not cover the region of Podlasie, was no longer significant after 1866 and it is not marked on the map.

The figure 3 shows not only the boundaries of the partitions, but also the latitudinal system of road infrastructure, which was favored by every occupier in the 19th century and strengthened during the period of the Polish People's Republic, because the central investment programs included projects facilitating transit between the USSR and the GDR, as well as the military needs of the Warsaw Pact.⁵⁰ This system of latitudinal infrastructure is visible in the relative difficulties of reaching Olsztyn or Nowy Sącz compared to cities such as Poznań or Zielona Góra. Furthermore, the average of all these efficiency coefficients of the links with the 48 biggest cities of the country is of 1,062 for Warsaw and is lower than the analog average calculated for the cities situated in the west of the country such as Poznań (1,115). This shows that the road accessibility of the capital is lower than in the case of western cities.

This map shows in part a problem with the efficiency of links with medium-sized towns that lost their status of a voivodeship capital in 1999. One of the functional problems of these cities, apart from the demographic and financial problems, is their poor road and rail accessibility.⁵¹ The efficiency of transport links is particularly low in towns and villages in the east of the country. The reasons for the difficulties of medium-sized cities can be seen, among other things, in the inefficiency of the polarization-diffusion model of national and European policies. It is a concept of regional development that dominates in the European Union's quorum, based on the assumption that powerful development centers (the major urban centers) should be supported by the government, while the surrounding areas will benefit automatically from the diffusion of economic and social effects coming from big cities.⁵² Similarly, this model assumes that direct support addressed to small towns is not effective. However, practice indicates that theoretically assumed large city radiation is limited to their closest environment, while medium-sized cities further away are becoming more and more marginalized and peripheral.⁵³

The use of a polarization-diffusion model in the European regional development policy, although focused mainly on support for large cities, also provides support for rural areas located in close proximity to cities. However, this policy ignores remote rural areas in large urban centers.⁵⁴ For this reason, the Cohesion Fund and the European Regional Development Fund should be complemented by the European Agricultural Fund, the European Social Fund and the European Fisheries Fund. Eastern Poland regions, in which medium-sized towns are most affected by marginalization, where households deviate most from the EU average from disposable income, are supported by funds from a separate operational program entitled "Eastern Poland". This program is financed under the European Regional Development Fund.

⁵⁰ J. Kaliński, *Motoryzacja a infrastruktura drogowa w Polsce po 1918 roku*, SGH, 2014, p. 147.


⁵¹ J. Potocki, A. Babczuk, *Wybrane aspekty marginalizacji dawnych miast wojewódzkich*, Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu, 2015, p. 2-13.

⁵² J. Rakowska, *Praktyczne znaczenie zastosowania wyrównawczego lub polaryzacyjno-dyfuzyjnego modelu rozwoju regionalnego dla obszarów wiejskich w Polsce po 2013 roku*, „Wieś jutra”, SGGW, 11/12 (160/161), 2011, p. 26-27.

⁵³ J. Potocki, A. Babczuk, *Wybrane aspekty...*, p. 13.

⁵⁴ J. Rakowska, *Praktyczne znaczenie zastosowania wyrównawczego lub polaryzacyjno-dyfuzyjnego modelu rozwoju regionalnego dla obszarów wiejskich w Polsce po 2013 roku*, „Wieś jutra”, SGGW, 11/12 (160/161), 2011, p. 26-27.

Figure 3: Time efficiency of road journeys between the capital and each of the 48 capital cities of old voivodships.



Source: own elaboration based on the data calculated using <https://www.google.com/maps>.

The reduction of inequalities and the European funds in Poland

In 2004, Poland joined the European Union. The Polish European Union membership referendum took place in 2003. A large majority of voters expressed their approval for joining the EU, especially in the Western part of Poland (between 77 and 100%). However, in the Eastern part of Poland, some regions were more reluctant (the most reluctant was Lublin Voivodship with the approval rate of only 63.25%). The result of the 2003 referendum showed that the more we move Eastwards, the less Polish people are in favor of the EU membership.⁵⁵ On a national scale, 77.6% of voters were in favor of the EU membership during this referendum. Since 2003, the level of approval quickly jumped to 91% in 2004 and, after some fluctuations, in 2019, this proportion was still at the level of 91% against 5% of those who wanted Poland to leave the EU and 4% of those undecided.⁵⁶

Despite some aforementioned doubts concerning the effectiveness of some aspects of the European policy, in the current geopolitical system (after an access to the European Union), Poland has an excellent opportunity for internal infrastructure integration. This is a unique opportunity across the centuries. At the same time, Polish functional problems, including those related to transport, have a dimension which is broader than only national. It is a pan-European dimension. Communication difficulties in the EU areas include: physical connection of (terrestrial) transport routes; less developed links between former members of the Union and the countries of the former Eastern Bloc; the need to create new transport lines as well as new community enlargements and a deepening of internal integration.⁵⁷

The diversification of the level of regional development in the European Union was the premise of the implementation of the cohesion policy. Its main instruments in the field of transport

⁵⁵ La Pologne au cœur de l'Europe, *Revue Questions Internationales*, no 69, sept./octobre 2014.


⁵⁶ <https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/wydarzenia/artykuly/596414,polska-w-unii-europejskie-poparcie-rekord-sondaz.html>.

⁵⁷ J. Brdulak, *Infrastruktura transportowa*, I. Fierla (red.): *Geografia ekonomiczna Unii Europejskiej*. Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, Warszawa 2007, str. 276-277.

infrastructure are the Cohesion Fund and the European Regional Development Fund. The Cohesion Fund⁵⁸ is allocated to Member States whose per capita gross national income (GNI) is less than 90% of the Community average, while the European Regional Development Fund⁵⁹ targets the poorest regions of the European Union and is not limited to the poorest countries. Poland is leading the race among the beneficiary states of these two structural funds (see Appendix 1). For the period 2014-2020, the funding earmarked for regional and cohesion policy⁶⁰ amounts to € 644 billion €, from which the E.U. is financing 461 billion € (72 %) and member state 183 billion € (European Structural and Investment Funds). From this budget, 69,4 billion € (55 % CF and 45 % ERDF) are dedicated to network infrastructure in transport and energy (57,5 billion € from Europe and 12 billion € from the Member State). It means 11 % of the total budget for European Structural and Investment Funds.

From European funding, Poland has been allocated 19 % of this amount (86 billion). Italy is getting half of this amount (45 billion €) and France : 28 billion €⁶¹. Poland is indeed a major beneficiary of the EU funding (see Appendix 1 and 2): in the 2014-2020 period, Poland benefits from European Structural and Investment Funds of 86 billion €. 19 billion € were financed by Poland itself which means 105 billion € in total financing⁶². It means 2 262 € per inhabitant from EU budget over period 2014-2020. 38,8 % of funds financed by to Poland were earmarked for infrastructure and environment (ERDF⁶³). With European fundings, it means 45.3 % (graphe 1). Furthermore, 26% was earmarked for Cohesion Fund⁶⁴ (total financing Europe and Poland). 14,5 % for human capital (European Social Fund) and 12% for European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD).

Graph 1 : Poland positioning in European Structural and Investment Funds



Source : <https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/overview#>

The main aim of funding in Poland is network infrastructures in transport and energy with 28 billion € (total financing Poland and Europe, ERDF and Cohesion Fund it means 40 %

⁵⁸ https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/cohesion-fund/

⁵⁹ https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/erdf/

⁶⁰ EU payments made to the Member States and Interreg programmes, and achievements (targets, decided and implemented) under the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) 2014-2020

⁶¹ <https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/overview#>


⁶² <https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/countries/PL#>

⁶³ Research and Innovation, Digital Economy, SME Competitiveness and Low Carbon Economy but also interreg – cross-border, transnational and interregional co-operation under the Territorial Co-operation objective

⁶⁴ Trans-European transport networks and projects dealing with EU environmental priorities.

of the total financing: see graph 1). Poland is ranking first in the transport – energy budget allocation, far ahead of Romania.

Graph 2 : budget allocated to Transport and Energy



Source : <https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/themes/7#>

The Varmian-Mazurian province has received more than 140% of the national average (the national average of structural funds received by inhabitant was equal to 100%). The Holy Cross Voivodeship has been granted around 130%. Podlaskie, Lublin, West Pomeranian and Lubusz Voivodeships have received between 110 and 130%. The Mazovian, Łódź, Upper Silesia, Grater Poland and Lesser Poland Voivodeships have been allocated between 80 and 90% of the average amount of structural funds per capita.

The following table 1 shows the framework of regional policy in the European Union for the last six multi-annual financial frameworks and indicates to what extent Poland is involved in the multi-annual financial frameworks of the EU. The total EU expenditure in 2017 as the percentage of Poland’s gross national income (GNI) is of 2.67%. At the same time, the Polish contribution to the EU budget as the percentage of its GNI is of 0.68%.

Table 1: Framework of regional policy in the European Union for the last six multi-annual financial framework.


Period	EU context	Cohesion Policy budget	Cohesion policy share in MFF and GNI (in %)	Cuts: total MFF vs cohesion policy (in %) (1)	Breakdown of Poland’s finances with the EU in 2017

1988-1992	Budget crisis – EU 9 - 12 – Single market	Common objectives, multi-annual progr.	25,5/0,3	3/2,5	1) Total EU spending in Poland: € 11.921 billion 2) Total EU spending as % of Polish gross national income (GNI): 2.67 % 3) Total Polish contribution to the EU budget: € 3.048 billion 4) Polish contribution to the EU budget as % of its GNI: 0.68 %
1993-1999	EMU preparation – Maastricht Treaty – EU 12-15	Cohesion Fund	33,1/0,4	8,5/8,8	
2000-2006	Agenda 2000 – EU 15-25	Effectiveness, decentralization, audit	30,2/0,38	3/7	
2007-2013	Lisbon Strategy – EU 25-28, Financial crisis	Alignment with broad EU strategy	35,8/0,4	15,4/8,7	
2014-2020	Europe 2020 Euro crisis	Conditionality	33,9/0,3	8/4	
2021-2027	EFSD, Brexit, white paper on the future of Europe	Result oriented, simplification	?	?	

Source: extended (last column) from: Wolfgang Petzold, EU cohesion policy: a short history of its future, Dublin, 2017; MFF: means multi-annual financial framework; GNI: Gross national income; (1) Comparison of cuts in % of total MFF and cohesion policy allocations: initial proposal by the European Commission vs. final agreement of Council and EP; last column: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/poland_en.

Poland is a specific EU member state: during the crisis of 2008-2012, Poland was the only European country that do not have experienced a recession. A funny drawing in a local newspaper at this time was entitled: “this country is resistant to everything, including the today’s crisis!”.⁶⁵ Since the enlargement, the GIN per capita in % of the EU average increased from 48.8% in 2003 to 62.9% in 2012 (see graph 1 below).

Graph 1: Poland GDP per capita (in PPS); index 100 for EU28



Source: Growing together : EU support to Poland since 2004, European Commission, p. 4.

Poland is then the main beneficiary of European structural funds and it received 19% of the European subsidies for 2014-2020 (France : 6 % ; Italy : 10 %). The convergence of

⁶⁵ La Pologne au cœur de l’Europe, questions internationales, n. 69, sept. Octobre 2014.


Poland towards the Western European standards was very fast. Since 2004, the ratio between the Polish and European GDP per capita went up by 15 percentage points.

The allocation and management of the European funds has been improved as well: between 2007 and 2013, regions have received 60% of the EU regional subsidies and the rest was allocated to the central authorities (Q.I., 2014). The following graph is showing the implementation in % of planned projects by Fund for Poland in terms of total cost (National + European funding). The next slides show a comparison with France and Italy.

Implementation by Fund for Poland, (Total Cost) % of Planned


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Period Covered:

EMFF: 31/12/2018, EAFRD: 31/12/2018, YEI, ESF, ERDF: 31/12/2018


Refresh Date: 9/8/2019

	Planned	Decided	Spent
YEI	€1 117 509 008 (100%)	€1 087 050 260 (97%)	€622 959 509 (56%)

Implementation by Fund for Italy, (Total Cost) % of Planned

[Explore and Share this Data](#)

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Period Covered:

EMFF: 31/12/2018, EAFRD: 31/12/2018, YEI, ESF, ERDF: 31/12/2018

Refresh Date: 9/8/2019

As was mentioned before, since 2004, Poland has largely benefited from the European Union integration process. Since 2003, Poland's GDP per capita as a percentage of the EU average has increased by 22 percentage points (EC, 2019). Poland is thus converging to the average of the EU: over the period of 2003-2018, Poland's GDP per capita increased by 100%, which means that Poland has doubled its wealth. Table 2 shows that Poland economic growth rate is higher than the European Union growth rate. Unemployment rate was below the EU level in the analyzed period.

The European Commission has published some data concerning the recent action of the EU aimed at Poland, especially the Juncker plan for the recovery after the financial crisis: € 175 billion will be invested over the 2004-2020 period (European Structural and Investment Funds). The Juncker Plan has mobilized € 18,3 billion to face the economic crisis and help in the recovery process. Since 2002, 2,6 million jobs were created in Poland which was of a benefit to the whole European Single Market.


Table 2: GDP growth, employment and unemployment, Poland and the EU, 2000-2015.

	2000-2007	2007-2009	2009-2011	2011-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015
GDP growth (av. % pa)	Annual average % pa					
Poland	4,1	3,3	4,4	1,4	3,3	3,5
EU average	2,3	-2	1,9	-0,1	1,4	1,9
	2000	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015
Employment rate (% 20-64)						
Poland	61,1	62,7	64,9	64,5	64,9	67,8
EU average	66,5	69,8	68,9	68,6	68,4	70,1
Unemployment rate (% Lab force)						
Poland	16,3	9,6	8,2	9,6	10,3	7,5
EU average	9,2	7,1	8,9	9,6	10,8	9,3

Source: WP1: Synthesis report: Ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy programs 2007-2013, focusing on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF) ; Task 3 Country Report Poland, September 2016, p. 10.

The following map shows the level of regional inequalities in the country. As noted above in the paper regarding the accessibility, the Mazovian Voivodeship has largely benefited from the economic development of Poland within the EU.

Map 3: Poland and NUTS 2 regions, GDR per capita (PPS), 2014



Source: WP1: Synthesis report: Ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy programmes 2007-2013, focusing on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF); Task 3 Country Report Poland, September 2016, p. 7.

Concerning transport issues, a synthesis report of the regional policy towards Poland clearly confirms our analysis: “The distribution of funding between broad policy areas was largely in line with the priorities set out in the National Strategic Reference Framework. In particular, a large share (45%) went to Transport, reflecting the priority given to improving communication links, especially roads, both in the Eastern part of the country and between the regions located there and the rest of Poland” (EC, WP1, p. 12).

“In the course of the programming period, a number of shifts in funding between policy areas were made(...). The main change was the increase in funding for innovation and SME support and for roads. The increase for roads was mainly compensated by reductions in funding for rail and ‘other transport’. The funding for rail in particular was reduced as a consequence of delays caused by managerial deficiencies in the companies responsible, *Polskie Koleje Państwowe* (Polish State Railways) and *PLK PKP* (Polish Railway Tracks)” (WP1, p. 12).

The table 3 shows the information concerning the regional structural funds earmarked to Poland. As stated in the WP1 report, the initial funding from the ERDF and the Cohesion

Fund was of € 55.5 billion but it was increased to € 57.2 billion due to the allocation from the performance reserve in 2011 and a ‘technical adjustment’ allocation. Funding was equivalent to just over 2% of GDP and represented nearly 41% of the government capital expenditure (see table 3 - 2016). Between 2007 and 2015, the European Union increased its funding. At the same time, Poland reduced its co-financing by € 5 billion.

Table 3: ERDF and Cohesion fund resources and national co-financing for the 2007-2013 period in Poland, initial (2007) and last (April 2016).

	2007				2016			
	EU Funding	National public funding	National private funding	Total	EU Funding	National public funding	National private funding	Total
EUR million POLAND								
Convergence change 2007-2014	54 515	12 395	2 707	70 617	57 178	7 995	2 626	67 800
Convergence % GDP	2,2	0,5	0,1	2,8	2,3	0,3	0,1	2,7
% Gvt capital expenditure	39,8	8,9	1,9	50,6	40,9	5,7	1,9	48,6
Per head (EUR pa)	207,8	46,4	10,1	264,3	214	29,9	9,8	253,8
EU12								
% GDP	2,1	0,4	0,1	2,6	2,2	0,4	0,1	2,6
% gvt expenditure	38,3	7,6	1	46,9	38,7	6,4	1,4	46,5
Per head (EUR pa) in convergence	212,4	42,1	5,6	260,2	214,6	35,5	7,8	258

Note: EU funding relates to decided amounts as agreed in 2007 and as at 14 April 2016. The figures for % GDP and % Govt. capital expenditure relate to funding for the period as % of GDP and of General Government capital expenditure aggregated over the years 2007-2013. Govt. capital expend is the sum of General Government gross fixed capital formation and capital transfers. The EU12 figures are the total for the EU12 countries for comparison.⁶⁶

Funds allocated to rail and road infrastructure

The tables in Appendix 2 show the share of ERDF and Cohesion funds which are intended to road and railway investments divided by the number of inhabitants of 2017, as well as the beneficiary structure (by voivodeships). These tables have been created using the government subsidy map of the European Union and they are related to the current budget period (2014-2020).⁶⁷

Moreover, it is unexpected that the western voivodeships of Lubusz and Opole are relatively high in this ranking, despite the fact that there is a separate fund for eastern voivodeships under the Operational Program “Eastern Poland”. At the same time, the total amount of funds earmarked for rail investments is more than half that of funds supporting road investments. The average value of the Cohesion Fund and the European Regional Development Fund for road and rail investments divided by the number of inhabitants for the whole of Poland

⁶⁶ WP1: Synthesis report: Ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy programmes 2007-2013, focusing on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF); Task 3 Country Report Poland, September 2016, p. 12.

⁶⁷ <http://www.mapadotacji.gov.pl/>

is € 333.70. In the Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship, which ranks highest in this ranking, this value rises to € 593.63. For Kuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeship, located at the bottom of the ranking, it amounts to only € 118,13. In absolute terms, the Mazovian Voivodeship, which is the most populated, is the highest in the ranking with a sum of € 2,531,582,474.25 allocated for the development of road or rail infrastructure.

The tables with internal fund statistics indicate that the Podlasie Voivodship is the main beneficiary of the funds received under the Operational Program “Eastern Poland” with more than € 364 million earmarked for rail and road investments.

Conclusion

Poland plays an important role in the European Union. After many years of occupation until regaining the independence in 1918, in its long history, Poland is now a bridge between Western Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States and Ukraine. The country is largely benefiting from this situation: Poland is the first beneficiary of the EU Cohesion Policy funds, well ahead of Italy and Spain (Appendix 1). New roads are being built, railway tracks are being renovated, city centers and other degraded districts are being revitalized. Polish countryside and the main cities are flourishing.

In the field of transport infrastructure, the paper shows that the regional policy of the European Union has reduced the original inequalities in the rail and road infrastructure development inherited from the Partitions of Poland between Prussia, Austria and Russia. With regard to the railway infrastructure, we notice that track closures is also significant in this convergence. The paper also indicates a problem with the accessibility of medium-sized towns that lost their status of a voivodeship capital in 1999. One of the functional problems of these cities, apart from the demographic and financial problems, is their poor road and rail accessibility. The paper is then expressing some critics on the model of polarization-diffusion model in the European regional development policy, especially for Eastern Poland which is not so much benefiting from the regional policy of the EU. In conclusion, convergence towards the EU average still occurs in Poland.

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

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APPENDIX 1



APPENDIX 2

Funds allocated to the road and railway infrastructure per capita (2014-2020)		Funds allocated to the railway infrastructure per capita (2014-2020)	
Warmian-Masurian	€ 593,63	Lubusz Voivodeship	€ 274,62
Lubusz Voivodeship	€ 584,60	Masovian	€ 174,94
Podlaskie	€ 495,64	Warmian-Masurian	€ 147,66
Masovian	€ 470,15	Łódź Voivodeship	€ 137,84
Holy Cross Voivodeship	€ 424,94	Podlaskie	€ 80,20
Lublin Voivodeship	€ 294,99	West Pomeranian	€ 78,83
Opole Voivodeship	€ 287,72	Subcarpathian	€ 75,33
Lower Silesian	€ 255,57	Holy Cross Voivodeship	€ 62,06
Pomeranian	€ 253,80	Silesian	€ 58,31
West Pomeranian	€ 239,56	Pomeranian	€ 50,37
Łódź Voivodeship	€ 193,67	Lesser Poland	€ 30,33
Subcarpathian	€ 192,82	Greater Poland	€ 20,76
Greater Poland	€ 180,73	Lower Silesian	€ 20,60
Lesser Poland	€ 160,28	Opole Voivodeship	€ 19,87
Silesian	€ 154,57	Lublin Voivodeship	€ 18,72
Kujavian-Pomeranian	€ 118,13	Kuyavian-Pomeranian	€ 1,69
Funds allocated to the road infrastructure per capita (2014-2020)			
Warmian-Masurian	€ 445,98		
Podlaskie	€ 415,43		
Holy Cross Voivodeship	€ 362,88		
Lubusz Voivodeship	€ 309,97		
Masovian	€ 295,22		
Lublin Voivodeship	€ 276,27		
Opole Voivodeship	€ 267,86		
Lower Silesian	€ 234,96		
Pomeranian	€ 203,42		
West Pomeranian	€ 160,74		
Greater Poland	€ 159,97		
Lesser Poland	€ 129,95		
Subcarpathian	€ 117,49		
Kuyavian-Pomeranian	€ 116,44		
Silesian	€ 96,26		
Łódź Voivodeship	€ 55,83		

Source: own elaboration based on <http://www.mapadotacji.gov.pl>.

COHESION FUND 2014-2020		
Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment		
TEN-T road and air transport network development		5 157 412 064,83 €
TEN-T road network development		5 130 726 018,32 € 100%
	Mazovian	1 436 044 699,15 € 28,0%
	Warmian-Masurian	540 475 355,97 € 10,5%
	Lower Silesian	507 744 004,49 € 9,9%
	Lesser Poland	381 590 166,80 € 7,4%
	Greater Poland	360 833 276,34 € 7,0%
	Silesian	315 159 205,20 € 6,1%
	West Pomeranian	274 141 164,03 € 5,3%
	Pomeranian	232 635 037,65 € 4,5%
	Lubusz Voivodeship	228 830 753,82 € 4,5%
	Lublin Voivodeship	200 746 217,20 € 3,9%
	Kuyavian-Pomeranian	166 581 601,55 € 3,2%
	Podlaskie	157 021 535,38 € 3,1%
	Holy Cross Voivodeship	141 611 062,88 € 2,8%
	Subcarpathian	96 001 472,75 € 1,9%
	projects of the country as a whole	91 310 465,12 € 1,8%
	Łódź Voivodeship	- € 0,0%
	Opole Voivodeship	- € 0,0%
TEN-T rail network development		2 036 192 305,40 € 100%
	Mazovian	771 019 051,24 € 37,9%
	projects of the country as a whole	467 397 185,17 € 23,0%
	Łódź Voivodeship	305 297 891,34 € 15,0%
	Lubusz Voivodeship	260 438 139,71 € 12,8%
	Greater Poland	57 586 311,34 € 2,8%
	Pomeranian	57 224 982,23 € 2,8%
	Lesser Poland	45 947 624,87 € 2,3%
	Subcarpathian	45 947 624,87 € 2,3%
	Warmian-Masurian	13 538 012,81 € 0,7%
	West Pomeranian	11 795 481,83 € 0,6%
	Lower Silesian	- € 0,0%
	Kuyavian-Pomeranian	- € 0,0%
	Lublin Voivodeship	- € 0,0%
	Opole Voivodeship	- € 0,0%
	Podlaskie	- € 0,0%
	Silesian	- € 0,0%
	Holy Cross Voivodeship	- € 0,0%
Development of the railway network outside the TEN-T		1 061 482 124,00 € 100%
	Silesian	265 196 620,10 € 25,0%
	Mazovian	170 943 031,76 € 16,1%
	projects of the country as a whole	147 073 129,71 € 13,9%
	West Pomeranian	122 646 543,29 € 11,6%
	Subcarpathian	75 573 019,67 € 7,1%
	Pomeranian	59 855 633,53 € 5,6%
	Lower Silesian	59 802 596,83 € 5,6%
	Lesser Poland	56 914 299,37 € 5,4%
	Łódź Voivodeship	36 028 032,28 € 3,4%
	Opole Voivodeship	19 670 472,95 € 1,9%
	Lubusz Voivodeship	18 806 329,13 € 1,8%
	Greater Poland	14 864 250,52 € 1,4%
	Kuyavian-Pomeranian	3 527 041,21 € 0,3%
	Lublin Voivodeship	3 527 041,21 € 0,3%
	Holy Cross Voivodeship	3 527 041,21 € 0,3%
	Warmian-Masurian	3 527 041,21 € 0,3%
	Podlaskie	- € 0,0%

Source: own elaboration based on <http://www.mapadotacji.gov.pl>.

EUROPEAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND 2014-2020				
Operational Program Infrastructure and Environment				
Increased accessibility of urban centers belonging to the TEN-T road network and relief of excessive road traffic in cities		1 382 935 878,78 €	100%	
	Pomeranian	225 304 130,71 €	16,3%	
	Holy Cross Voivodeship	201 699 116,64 €	14,6%	
	Greater Poland	197 319 724,80 €	14,3%	
	projects of the country as a whole	166 673 362,23 €	12,1%	
	Lower Silesian	138 220 098,50 €	10,0%	
	Mazovian	93 720 058,56 €	6,8%	
	Lubusz Voivodeship	66 691 228,22 €	4,8%	
	Łódź Voivodeship	62 680 116,84 €	4,5%	
	Podlaskie	61 860 303,85 €	4,5%	
	Lesser Poland	59 121 040,03 €	4,3%	
	Warmian-Masurian	49 083 807,52 €	3,5%	
	Lublin Voivodeship	38 074 425,25 €	2,8%	
	Kuyavian-Pomeranian	19 039 013,97 €	1,4%	
	Subcarpathian	3 449 451,66 €	0,2%	
	Opole Voivodeship	- €	0,0%	
	Silesian	- €	0,0%	
	West Pomeranian	- €	0,0%	
Increased accessibility of urban centers outside the TEN-T road network and relief of excessive road traffic in cities		828 745 985,91 €	100%	
	Opole Voivodeship	265 196 620,10 €	32,0%	
	Lublin Voivodeship	170 943 031,76 €	20,6%	
	Silesian	122 646 543,29 €	14,8%	
	Łódź Voivodeship	75 573 019,67 €	9,1%	
	Mazovian	59 855 633,53 €	7,2%	
	Kuyavian-Pomeranian	56 914 299,37 €	6,9%	
	Lower Silesian	36 028 032,28 €	4,3%	
	Lubusz Voivodeship	19 670 472,95 €	2,4%	
	Pomeranian	14 864 250,52 €	1,8%	
	Subcarpathian	3 527 041,21 €	0,4%	
	Podlaskie	3 527 041,21 €	0,4%	
	projects of the country as a whole	- €	0,0%	
	Lesser Poland	- €	0,0%	
	Holy Cross Voivodeship	- €	0,0%	
	Warmian-Masurian	- €	0,0%	
	Greater Poland	- €	0,0%	
	West Pomeranian	- €	0,0%	
Operational Programme Eastern Poland		1 408 195 798,55 €	100%	
Funds allocated to the road and railway infrastructure		1 192 691 199,65 €	84,7%	
Funds allocated to the road infrastructure		753 963 486,50 €	53,5%	
Funds allocated to the railway infrastructure		438 727 713,15 €	31,2%	
	projects of the country as a whole	5 523 802,62 €	0,4%	
	Podlaskie	390 057 925,33 €	27,7%	100%
<i>Funds allocated to the road and railway infrastructure</i>		364 696 311,06 €	25,9%	77%
<i>Funds allocated to the road infrastructure</i>		269 692 311,15 €	19,2%	64%
<i>Funds allocated to the railway infrastructure</i>		95 003 999,91 €	6,7%	13%
	Lublin Voivodeship	279 529 170,29 €	19,9%	100%
<i>Funds allocated to the road and railway infrastructure</i>		213 957 772,51 €	15,2%	71%
<i>Funds allocated to the road infrastructure</i>		177 679 338,91 €	12,6%	56%
<i>Funds allocated to the railway infrastructure</i>		36 278 433,60 €	2,6%	15%
	Warmian-Masurian	275 982 108,45 €	19,6%	100%
<i>Funds allocated to the road and railway infrastructure</i>		244 611 237,61 €	17,4%	93%
<i>Funds allocated to the road infrastructure</i>		49 945 170,35 €	3,5%	69%
<i>Funds allocated to the railway infrastructure</i>		194 666 067,26 €	13,8%	24%
	Subcarpathian	261 296 002,00 €	18,6%	100%
<i>Funds allocated to the road and railway infrastructure</i>		186 051 268,90 €	13,2%	94%
<i>Funds allocated to the road infrastructure</i>		147 182 729,82 €	10,5%	56%
<i>Funds allocated to the railway infrastructure</i>		38 868 539,08 €	2,8%	38%
	Holy Cross Voivodeship	195 806 789,86 €	13,9%	100%
<i>Funds allocated to the road and railway infrastructure</i>		183 374 609,57 €	13,0%	89%
<i>Funds allocated to the road infrastructure</i>		109 463 936,27 €	7,8%	18%
<i>Funds allocated to the railway infrastructure</i>		73 910 673,30 €	5,2%	71%

Source: own elaboration based on <http://www.mapadotacji.gov.pl>.