

Process Justice in Transit-oriented Development in Hong Kong: the case of Kai Tak station development

Abstract

Originally conceived to create equitable and sustainable communities, Transit-oriented Development (TOD) has received increasing scholarly attention on its adverse social equity and justice implications. However, existing research largely focuses on outcomes and less on justice in the planning processes. In this paper, we aim to analyse process justice in the planning of Kai Tak station TOD as a case to gain insights into the planning of TOD in Hong Kong. Guided by an analytical framework we developed for analysing justice in TOD, we examined stakeholders' interaction and dynamics in its planning process mainly through the lens of Rules-in-Use under the Institution Assessment and Development (IAD) model. Through this, we found four key issues in the planning process of Kai Tak station development: (i) dominance and unilateral nature of government actors, (ii) imbalances between 'transit' and 'housing development' stakeholders, (iii) different (and often opposing) sets of Rules-in-Use observed by the formal project team and external stakeholders, and (iv) inconsistency and ambiguity in many of the Rules-in-Use. On this basis, we put forth some recommendations with a view to providing policymakers with insights to implement TOD more justly in Hong Kong's future.

Keywords

TOD; Hong Kong; process justice; planning; stakeholder interaction; Institution Assessment and Development

1. Introduction

Transit-oriented development (TOD) refers to developing dense, diverse, walkable neighbourhoods centred on transit, mainly train stations (Calthorpe, 1993). TOD promises various benefits, from increasing density and diversity, encouraging walking/cycling and transit use to curbing urban sprawl. (Hrelja *et al.*, 2020; Jamme *et al.*, 2019). However, scholars have also increasingly noted TOD's implications for social equality and justice, such as worsening housing affordability and inducing gentrification (Ibrahim *et al.*, 2022; Padeiro *et al.*, 2019). This is reflected in the emergent research themes within the TOD scholarship of sustainability, equity, and gentrification (Shatu *et al.*, 2022; Sun *et al.*, 2022). Research in this area commonly approaches justice in TOD through *equitable outcomes* and *fair distribution* (Ibraeva *et al.*, 2020; Lung-Amam *et al.*, 2019; Schweitzer and Valenzuela, 2004), such as property prices, distribution of social housing, household income, etc. Meanwhile, the planning and procedural sides of TOD, e.g. interactions and inclusion of stakeholders, are less well-understood (Hrelja *et al.*, 2020; Ibraeva *et al.*, 2020). Furthermore, in the broader disciplines of human geography and planning, Przybylinski (2022) noted the recent critique on the lack of normative theorisation of justice. Existing research tends to start 'from the ground' by identifying instances of wrong-doing and inequalities, and focusing their analysis on specific

issues or phenomenon deemed unjust (Barnett, 2018). However, they give less effort to draw from justice theories and concepts to support their analysis, nor establishing a normative framework to support why certain observations are unjust (Hopkins, 2021; Israel and Frenkel, 2018) and which/how injustices in planning process leads to unjust outcomes. In other words, analysis of justice in the planning process of TOD, situated within a comprehensive and conceptually-grounded framework, is relatively missing.


Hong Kong (HK) is often considered a benchmark of TOD implementation (Bruce, 2012). Some of HK's prominent features associated with TOD include its high transit ridership (especially its metro railway, MTR) (Loo *et al.*, 2010), dense and diverse development around MTR stations (Al-Kodmany *et al.*, 2022), and well-connected pedestrian networks between MTR stations and their surroundings (Hung, 2014). TOD is commonly positioned in HK as a Land Value Capture (LVC) strategy, implemented by MTR's 'Rail+Property' (R+P) model (Aveline and Blandeau, 2019; Cervero and Murakami, 2009; Li *et al.*, 2022). Under this model, MTR funds the building and operation of a new station in exchange for exclusive development rights at or near the station, and gains profits from selling or managing properties (with partner developers) which appreciate in value from being close to the station (Leong, 2016). The R+P model is frequently studied, from enabling MTR to run profitably without government subsidy, facilitating place and community development around new stations, and guaranteeing sufficient passenger numbers (Aveline and Blandeau, 2019; Hung, 2014; Murakami, 2015).

As in the broader TOD literature, the social equity and justice implications of the R+P model and TOD in HK have received substantial attention (Jauregui-Fung, 2022). Cervero and Murakami (2009) found that housing in R+P commanded a 5% to 30% price premium when compared to similar properties, which "unquestionably benefits MTR's 'bottom line'; however, it does little to promote affordable housing in an expensive, land constrained city like Hong Kong." (p. 2038). He *et al.* (2018) found that land allocation near MTR stations seems to have preferred private residential development at the detriment of 'public housing' (which in HK refers to subsidised government-built social housing) in the recent two decades. In their political-economy analysis that examines MTR's changing business model in R+P projects, Aveline and Blandeau (2019) noted the increasing criticism towards MTR for not providing any public housing despite its role as a developer. More recent research further demonstrated the connection between TODs and gentrification in HK, both perceived by residents living in their catchment areas (He *et al.*, 2021) and objectively measured by education and income levels of newly moved-in residents (Liang *et al.*, 2022). These existing literature examined injustices from the angle of outcomes quite extensively, but similar to broader TOD literature, there is limited attention on justice in the planning and implementation process of TOD in HK.

Therefore, in this paper, we aim to analyse the process justice of Kai Tak, a newly developed TOD in HK, through its stakeholder dynamics and interactions, with a view to suggesting how justice may be advanced in HK's future TOD. This acts as a case study to address the broader gap within the TOD literature, namely examining TOD's process justice situated within a conceptually-grounded framework. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study analysing the interaction of various stakeholders in the planning process of TOD in HK.

2. Theoretical framework

To analyse justice in TOD, this paper adopts Yip et al. (2024)'s analytical framework which "provide[s] general guidance to systematically position and analyse justice issues of TOD" (p.2). Two theoretical elements underpin the analytical framework - for analysing process justice, the *Institution Assessment and Development (IAD) model* by Polski and Ostrom (1999); and for analysing outcome justice, the *5Ds of the built environment* originating from Cervero and Kockelman (1997) and supplemented by Cervero and Murakami (2008). The analytical framework is shown in Figure 1, followed by an explanation of its three main parts.



Source: (Yip et al., 2024)

Figure 1: Analytical framework of process and outcome justice in TOD

2.1 Context

(I) Context refers to background attributes, from socio-economic conditions, strategies and policies, to stakeholders and community preferences. These attributes set the context within which stakeholders come together, interact and make decisions (McGinnis, 2011). In this paper, (I) Context could be interpreted as the general background of the TOD case, which we elaborate in Part 3.2 later.

2.2 Process

Afterwards comes (II) Process, the core of the paper in analysing TOD's process justice, which is done via the IAD model's 'Rules-in-use'. They are implicit, hidden systems and rules that dictate the participation, interaction and decision-making of Actors (Polski and Ostrom, 1999), the key elements for applying the IAD. Notably, the Rules "concentrate on the operating rules that are commonly used by most participants and on the source of these rules, rather than on well-articulated but not widely observed rules" (Polski and Ostrom, 1999, p. 23), making it necessary to discover them through analysing the process when the Rules are in use (hence the name). In the IAD model, Polski and Ostrom (1999) delineated seven types of Rules-in-Use, under which we have developed some guidance questions to relate them more specifically to justice in TOD. These guidance questions form the basis of our data analysis, and are shown alongside the Rules-in-Use in Table 1 below.

Table 1: The seven Rules-in-Use in the IAD model

Rules-in-Use	Action verbs	Guidance questions for process justice in TOD
(i) Boundary	Be (not) involved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What parties are involved in planning process? • Who else is not involved but is interested and relevant to join, especially less powerful stakeholders? • Who decides what parties are involved, and where is this specified and formalised? • Are there dedicated efforts to identify and include disadvantaged stakeholders who are relevant and affected by the TOD? • To what extent is it possible to change who is involved during the planning process? How is this done?
(ii) Position	In charge of, be responsible for	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the roles and functions of the different parties in the planning process? • How are different parties positioned in the planning process? • Who determines the positions of different parties? • To what extent do parties of similar roles (e.g. different groups of residents, various developers) occupy similar positions? • What are dominating positions and who occupy them?
(iii) Authority	Able to do	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the power of different parties in the planning process? • What are the sources of power of these parties (e.g. legislation, convention, practical factors)? • What are the mandates and goals of different parties? • For parties that hold conflicting mandates and goals, how comparable and equal is their power?

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the safeguards to facilitate and maintain the power of disadvantaged stakeholders?
(iv) Information	Send and receive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the key pieces of relevant information in the planning process? • Who creates, controls and distributes the key pieces of information? • Are these pieces of information available to the public, only to some parties, or held in confidence? • What are the pieces of information that certain parties find to be important and relevant, but can't access? • To what extent is the information understandable without technical background or expertise?
(v) Aggregation	Decide jointly, by one self	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the key decisions to be made in the planning process? • How are these decisions made (e.g. individually, in consultation with others, collectively, etc.)? • Who is involved in the making of these decisions? • For decisions involving competing interests, who makes the final decisions? • How do(es) the said decision maker(s) take into account various interests and views? • How are the welfare of disadvantaged groups safeguarded in the key decisions?
(vi) Scope	Have jurisdiction, control over	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who specifies the overall visions and strategy of the TOD? • How do different parties influence the planning process? • What are the envisioned and actually controllable goals of different parties? • What are the discrepancies between the vision and controllable actions of the parties? • Whose visions and goals play a greater role or influence the planning process more? • To what extent are the visions and goals of disadvantaged groups taken into account in the planning process?
(vii) Payoff	Bear cost, earn profit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who bears the economic costs of the TOD project (such as public money, private capital, etc.)? • Who bears the social costs of the TOD project (e.g. demolition, relocation of residents and businesses)? • How is this cost allocation decided? • How much do those affected have a say in the cost allocation and compensation? • What are the expected benefits and profits (financial,

social, etc.) upon completion of the TOD?

- How will these benefits and profits be enjoyed by and allocated to different parties?

Source: (Yip *et al.*, 2024), drawn from (Ostrom, 2011; Polski and Ostrom, 1999)

In addition to the Rules-in-Use, (II) Process also contains the ‘planning and implementation’ component. It refers to the IAD model’s ‘Action Situation’, namely, the relevant arena where stakeholders join, interact with each other, perform their functions, and make decisions (Polski and Ostrom, 1999). We elaborate on this in Part 3.2 in describing the TOD selected.

2.3 Outcome

The remaining (III) Outcome refers to the 5Ds of the built environment (namely density, diversity, design, destination accessibility, and distance to transit). They are widely regarded as the essential elements and successful criteria of a TOD’s outcome (Hrelja *et al.*, 2020; Jamme *et al.*, 2019). These make up the full picture of justice but are not the focus of this paper.

3. The TOD case selected for analysis

3.1 Selecting the TOD case


To select the TOD case, we have adopted these criteria: Firstly, the case should be close to or recently completed, so that stakeholders have a fresh memory of their experiences. Also, the case should provide insights for future TODs in HK, which will mostly be smaller urban expansions on semi-rural lands, called New Development Areas (NDAs) (Transport and Housing Bureau, 2014). Due to their smaller scales and lower potential profitability for MTR, the government has been open in considering alternative models other than R+P (Transport and Housing Bureau, 2014), which lends support to choosing a TOD outside of R+P projects. An additional reason for choosing a non-R+P case is the already substantial amount of literature examining the well-known R+P model. This includes topics from analysing R+P as a financially sustainable LVC mechanism (Cervero and Murakami, 2008; Murakami, 2015), its transferability overseas (Cervero and Murakami, 2009; Jauregui-Fung, 2022) to the changing business model of MTR under R+P (Aveline and Blandeau, 2019). By looking at the stakeholder interaction of a non-R+P project, we hope to gain more novel insights.

3.2 The case of Kai Tak

Applying these criteria, we have selected Kai Tak station (啓德站) TOD as our case. It is located in Kowloon, a heavily urbanised part of HK, and used to be an international airport before its closure in 1997. This vacated a large piece of developable land (around 3.62 km²) right in HK’s urban core (Kai Tak Office, 2023), though its transformation was quite convoluted.

Since the beginning, Kai Tak's vision have undergone multiple fundamental changes, from 'CBD2' (a second CBD of HK), 'Energizing Kowloon East' (to revitalise development in the Kowloon East area, where Kai Tak is situated), to a tourism and major events hub, and currently, "a distinguished, vibrant, attractive and people-oriented community by the Victoria Harbour" (Kai Tak Office, 2023). The statutory land use zoning plan of Kai Tak (called the Outline Zoning Plan, or OZP) was revised five times in the past 15 years.

Back in 1998, an early feasibility study was conducted, followed by an initial development scheme in 2001. However, a court ruling in 2004 essentially banned harbour reclamation in the proposal, compelling a restart of the planning (Hong Kong Planning Department, 2006). After rounds of review and public engagement, a new OZP was published in 2007. Further changes were made to the OZP in 2009, 2012 and 2018. In 2020, another review was conducted to explore rezoning many of Kai Tak's commercial elements into housing, leading to Kai Tak's latest (and currently in-force) OZP published in 2022 (Kai Tak Office, 2023), as shown in Figure 2.1 below. The whole Kai Tak area consist of many elements (a cruise terminal, sports stadium, etc.), and the station area development¹, shown in Figure 2.2, is our case of interest.



Source: (Kai Tak Office, 2023)

Figure 2.1: Whole OZP of Kai Tak

¹ The catchment area of Kai Tak station is quite naturally defined. On three sides it is surrounded by existing major roads, which are also the boundary of the old airport site. On the remaining side (towards the South-West of the station) the catchment boundary is roughly halfway between Kai Tak station (our case) and the next station, Song Wong Toi station.



Legend

	Kai Tak Station
	Public Housing (Residential Group A)
	Private Housing (Residential Group B)
	Retail
	Commercial and Office
	Community, Institution and Government
	Green and open space
(XXX, 2025)	Under construction, with estimated completion year
(V)	Vacant, not yet developed
	Existing development, case boundary

Source: (OpenStreetMap, 2024; Town Planning Board, 2024)

Figure 2.2: Part of the OZP covering Kai Tak station area, with land-use zoning and names of development

Recalling the (II) Process component of our analytical framework, the planning and implementation process and the stakeholders involved should be clearly identified. For the former, we define the process to analyse as starting from the publication of Kai Tak's earlier OZP in 2007 (which largely formed the overall design today), the subsequent revisions, and up to the latest OZP published in 2022. As for the latter, the stakeholders involved consist of two camps – (i) institutional actors in the *formal project team* who are responsible for driving the process, including government departments handling planning, housing, transport matters, and the project consultants; and (ii) *external actors* outside of the formal team, including Legislative Council members (analogous to parliament members), property developers, MTR

as well as advocacies, researchers and residents, who are often represented by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The stakeholders interviewed are listed in Table 2 in Part 4 below.

4. Methods and Data

We conducted semi-structured interviews with individuals representing different relevant stakeholders to examine their interactions. Semi-structured interviews permit data collection to remain focused on the overall theme, while retaining flexibility to explore pertinent, emergent ideas to enhance understanding (Adeoye-Olatunde and Olenik, 2021). In total, 22 stakeholders were identified and invited by e-mail, post or letters delivered by hand. Among them, 6 stakeholders declined to be interviewed or gave no replies. They include District Councillors (elected officials that advise the government on local affairs and concerns) and the Civil Engineering and Development Department (an operational-level government agency that handles technical aspects of design, construction and maintenance of public infrastructure). In the end, 16 interviews with stakeholders were conducted between September and November 2022, either in person, online or over the phone. Among them, one stakeholder ended the interview prematurely (around 15 minutes into the interview) because they had other urgent business, cutting it too short to produce useful results. In the end, interviews with 15 stakeholders are included for analysis, as listed in Table 2 below.

Table 2: List of stakeholders interviewed

Code	Inter-viewee	Stakeholder represented (Abbreviation)	Description of the stakeholder	(i)	(ii)
R1	Senior officer	Development Bureau (DevB)	A ministry-level government unit that devises policies on land use, development, infrastructure and works	●	
R2	Senior officer	Housing Department (HouseD)	A government agency that both devises policy and conducts operations on public housing in HK that aims to accommodate the lower-income population	●	
R3	Senior officer	Transport Department (TranspD)	An operational-level government unit that implements transport policy, e.g. regulating public transport, managing road traffic and transport infrastructure	●	
R4	Member	Legislative Council (LegCo)	The legislative branch of the HK administration that scrutinises and approves laws, policies and public budgets, similar in		●

			role to a parliament		
R5	Senior staff	Property Developer (developer)	An international property developer with decades of experience in HK		●
R6	Senior staff	Property Developer (developer)	A major local property developer in HK		●
R7	Planning officer	Planning Department (PlanD)	A government agency that formulates spatial development strategies and plans, and enforce planning standards and requirements.	●	
R8	Officer	Consultant	An international consultant firm that conducts engineering, environmental, planning and other studies for clients such as property developers and the government	●	
R9	Senior officer	Consultant	A consultant firm that specialises in planning, development and engineering studies for the government	●	
R10	Officer	Consultant	A consultant firm that specialises in planning, development and engineering studies for the government	●	
R11	Researcher	Planning research organisation (NGO)	A local NGO that specialises in research in land use, planning and urban development		●
R12	Senior staff	Public housing advocacy group (NGO)	A local advocacy group that promotes the development and represents residents of public housing		●
R13	Staff	Local district advocacy group (NGO)	A local NGO that collects, analyses and presents views of residents in Kai Tak (and nearby districts) on their views and concerns		●
R14	Researcher	Public transport research organisation (NGO)	A local NGO that analyses and gives suggestions on transit policy and operation		●

R15	Senior officer	MTR	The operator of HK's railway, including trains, metro, light rail, and some buses		●
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(i) = The formal project team; (ii) = External stakeholders

Guided by prompts under the IAD and 5Ds models, the interview consists of (1) TOD in HK in general (mostly to get interviewees acquainted with the TOD concept) (2) the planning process of Kai Tak, and (3) the built environment outcome of Kai Tak. The focus and bulk of the discussion is on (2) the planning process of Kai Tak, in accordance with the paper's objective. The interview guide used is at **Annex 1** for reference.

We coded interviewees' responses to conduct thematic analysis, the process of sorting and categorising data, going back and forth between concrete bits of data and abstract concepts to identify and elaborate on recurrent topics and themes therein (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016). First, we formulated some broad codes from literature deductively, specifically how the Rules-in-Use could be applied to examine justice in TOD, i.e. the 'guidance questions' in Table 1. Meanwhile, some codes were also created inductively from the ideas and topics brought up by interviewees. These codes are important in understanding the Rules-in-Use since such rules are often not articulated or formalised, nor even conceptualised by the participants themselves, thus requiring efforts such as asking context-specific questions to elicit (Ostrom, 2011).

Afterwards, we further worked with the codes by branching them to form sub-codes (such as expanding from 'unclear or uncertain roles' to additional 'token role' and 'no rule') and grouping some codes into code groups (such as various codes under the code group 'challenges to get information'). This depends on factors such as how often the idea is mentioned (by an interviewee repeatedly or by others), how much further the interviewee elaborates on the idea, and comparisons with comments from other interviewees (Wyse *et al.*, 2017). This is an important process to discover from the surface, semantic level of the data the more interpretive, latent meanings and implications, which are then formed into insightful themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The coding tree used is at **Annex 2** for reference. In the following, we describe the key findings under each of the Rules-in-Use.

5. Findings – Rules-in-Use in the planning process of Kai Tak

5.2.1 Boundary – Unilaterally decided and limiting participation

Regarding 'Boundary' (namely who gets to participate), stakeholders were involved in Kai Tak's planning process to different extents. Many of the external stakeholders said that they were admitted into the process too late, inconsistently or not meaningfully. For instance, the LegCo member remarked "When they [the consultant] asked me for input, it was already so much planned that there's little I can change" (R4). Meanwhile, NGOs also commented feeling unsure if they would be included in a project, and some of them felt that their participation was quite ad-hoc and inconsequential.

These experiences can be attributed to who decides on the Boundary, as reflected the consultants' remarks:

“Basically, the government has District Offices established. They will tell us, in doing a project, which particular parties you need to ask around, and those people are the ones we need to approach” (R8).

“In our engagement process, the sample size is typically small... [whether we engage a person] really depends on the person's reputation and prestige with the government.” (R9).

These views were expressed by all of the consultants, whose roles were to collect and consolidate different stakeholders' input for their client (the government). These quotes show that the government largely directed the consultants on who to consult, and therefore the Boundary, having the power to determine which stakeholders were admitted.

5.2.2 Position – Driven by development and housing governmental actors while others played mostly reactive or passive roles

When describing their roles and functions in Kai Tak's planning, i.e. their 'Positions', a clear division emerged between the formal project team and external stakeholders (as classified in Table 2). Within the formal project team, DevB identified itself in the driver and leader roles, devising overall strategies and policies, “similar to a mayoral office or oversight ministry in some countries” (R1). As for HouseD and PlanD, also in the formal project team, both described themselves as playing active roles, though HouseD's reflected that it could exert relatively more power to ensure that its goals are met:

“As the Housing Department, apart from working on the individual housing projects, we also tell PlanD in long-term planning how many housing units we need, and to give us enough land for that. Then when PlanD allocates lands for our use. Of course they have their consideration, but [they] still need to fulfil the housing target we specified” (R2).

Meanwhile, a consultant said:

“We consultants act as bridges between everyone. We stir-fry their input, with our seasoning and cooking skills, into final dishes for our clients.” (R8)

This quote summarises the role of consultants – their role was to combine stakeholders' input together through “stir-frying”. This also implies that everyone's input was needed, since a dish couldn't be completed with missing ingredients. Then again, to make a dish wanted by their clients (the government), sometimes certain input might need to be adjusted tactfully, as in “seasonings” and “cooking skills”.

On the other hand, external stakeholders described their roles quite differently – the developers and MTR said they play passive and receiving roles, fulfilling functions assigned to them. For example, MTR said:

“It’s rather different for Kai Tak, as MTR had no property development, so we derived much less benefit from it. I would say it’s a government-driven plan, we provided railway services while the government progressively sold land, now fully covering the whole area” (R15).

The quote reflected MTR’s sentiment of having a smaller role in Kai Tak than a typical R+P project. MTR found it unusual not to have development rights in Kai Tak, unlike a typical R+P project in which MTR play a part in property development.

Meanwhile, advocacy groups and NGOs similarly said that they play passive, reactive or uncertain roles, sometimes “working hard just to jam a foot in the closing door” (R12). The same was true for the LegCo member:

“When they [the government] reach out to you for comments, most of the stuff was already decided. But they still include my name in the plan and said that I was consulted anyway” (R4).

This quote illustrates how the LegCo member was limited to a ‘token role’. Basically, he/she felt that the government only consulted him/her so that his/her name could be cited on the documents to show that consultation has taken place. In his/her view, the government had no intention to genuinely seek his/her views but do so only as a formality.

5.2.3 Authority – Housing actors gained power at the expense of transit actors while external actors felt limited and uncertain power

When it comes to ‘Authority’, i.e. the decisions each party can make and conflicts between them, a key emerging theme was the top political goal of providing housing. This led to shifts of power between stakeholders in the formal project team:

“We make our plans and state our demand for land. Then when they [PlanD] ask us what plots of land we want, given the shortage of public housing, unless building housing is technically not possible, we can take every plot of land on offer” HouseD (R2).

“With the great increase in housing... our Traffic Impact Assessments, and overall transit design, are no longer useful... which makes transit provision very challenging” TranspD (R3).

HouseD’s remarks refer to the land allocation process, where PlanD periodically identifies

available land in HK for different department's use. Here, HouseD reflected that they were basically able to claim every plot of land available, showing their significant power. While HouseD secured land in Kai Tak for public housing, TranspD reflected that their assessments and designs of transit capacity could not catch up. This demonstrates that in the formal project team, housing actors have been gaining more power, sometimes at the expense of transit actors.

Furthermore, the external stakeholders often felt that their power and authority lacked clarity and certainty. Representatives of more disadvantaged stakeholders, such as NGOs representing residents of the TOD, felt that they lack the proper and consistent authority to join or influence the planning process. For instance, they tried to submit detailed planning proposals, but "was instantly dismissed without much explanation, or consideration of even parts of our proposal" (R12). Even PlanD in the formal project team recognised this:

"As for [engaging] those NGOs... it depends solely on whether the government is willing to engage them, and through what channels. They can only operate under those restrictions. Most times, I would say [the NGOs] are limited to doing public campaigns or advocacy" (R7). -

5.2.4 Information – Accessible and transparent vs. issues with both strategic and specific information

Views on the generation, sharing and receiving of 'Information' again show a divide between the formal project team and external stakeholders. The formal project team (which includes the government stakeholders and consultants) said they had been improving the access and transparency of information, including publishing materials online (e.g. 5-year housing goals), and consulting the public in more accessible formats (e.g. planning workshops).

However, the external stakeholders seemed not to have felt the benefits of this, reporting challenges and limitations in the Information available:

"Kai Tak's earliest concept was devised... in the 1990s, if I remember correctly. Then its concept and vision changed many times and significantly each time... which greatly affected the area's property development" a developer (R5).

This quote illustrates one of the recurrent themes identified by external stakeholders – inconsistent or unpredictable strategic information. The developer pointed out that because Kai Tak's overall vision changed greatly multiple times, they found it hard to follow and develop properties accordingly. This issue of inconsistent strategic information was raised by many of the external stakeholders, and even PlanD, who described Kai Tak as being used as a "a solution space to build whatever's trendy at the time". On the other hand:

"It was only after I urged them [the government] that they engaged the consultant to study and generate more detailed statistics... though in the end they still didn't share that [information] with me" LegCo member (R4).

Here, the LegCo member's comments pointed to the other recurrent theme - the lack of finer, more specific information. Specifically, he/she faced barriers in obtaining more specific information from the formal project team. The same experience was shared also by the NGOs, who talked of the government being unwilling to share more detailed information (such the target number of housing units in a specific plot), or only when very late into the process.

5.2.5 Aggregation – Housing wielded more decision-power within the formal team, while external actors felt powerless in the Town Planning Board

Aggregation focuses on stakeholders' collective actions and decision-making. Through the interviews, we identified two main places where stakeholders interact and make decisions, which we describe as 'theatres of aggregation'- (i) between governmental actors and (ii) engaging external stakeholders.

In the first theatre of governmental actors, DevB remains the primary driver but HouseD seemed to have gained increasing influence:

“Basically, as soon as we [the government] have land to offer, the housing side would think about how to build houses – this is now the government's single top priority” DevB (R1).

“We understand that HK doesn't have enough land or housing, so when they say, can we perhaps tolerate a worse traffic situation here? Well, we try to accommodate that as much as we can” TranspD (R3).

DevB's comments revealed them witnessing how HouseD had grown more influential and powerful in collective decision-making, given housing as the government's top priority. Meanwhile, from TranspD's remarks we can see that when making decisions together (here about how dense housing could be, given Kai Tak's already built roads), TranspD admitted that they had to compromise with a “worse traffic situation”. Together, we saw the recurring theme of conflict between and dominance of housing over transit.

For the second theatre of engaging external stakeholders, arguably even more relevant to process justice as it involves the participation of less powerful parties, the main recurrent theme was the limitations of the Town Planning Board (TPB). The TPB serves as the main stakeholder engagement mechanism in spatial planning (including TOD projects) in HK. After PlanD prepares spatial plans (i.e. OZPs), TPB holds the statutory power to invite and consider views from the public (called ‘representations’), and to make amendments to the OZPs before their publication and implementation ² (Town Planning Board, 2023). However, external

² Strictly speaking, after TPB considered the public representations and made amendments to the OZP, it submits the OZP to the Chief Executive (head of the HK Government) for final decision. In reality, the decisions of the TPB on OZPs are usually approved by the Chief Executive and implemented without further change.

stakeholders who participated in TPB's engagement process mostly held negative views:

“Those people [TPB members] are all appointed by the government. They hold occasional meetings without doing or adding much to the planning process. Just sitting around and waiting for their honours [i.e. recognition from the HK government of dedicated public service]” a developer (R6).

Similar views were also voiced by the NGOs. They were likewise dissatisfied with TPB comprising government-appointed members only, and thought that the TPB did not meaningfully incorporate the views of different parties in their engagement process. For instance, the public research organisation (R12) recalled:

“In 2012 we submitted a ‘Kai Tak for the People’ proposal, quite a comprehensive one, but the TPB simply said there were too many great changes, and banned our plan... In our view, they [TPB] never regarded proposals that they received as feasible. Otherwise, they could at least provide some technical analysis, explain what problems they saw in our plan, rather than hastily and completely ban it.”

This further showed the frustration of external stakeholders with the lack of feedback or explanations, even when they tried to submit well-formulated proposals. Overall, it seemed that external stakeholders found themselves not valued in decision-making.

5.2.6 Scope – A shifting vision towards public housing without accommodating other scopes

For ‘Scopes’ (i.e. the envisioned and actually realised goals), most interviewees noted mismatches between their visions and the eventual outcome. An illustrative example is the monorail, originally conceived by DevB as a tourism feature (that fits Kai Tak earlier vision of a tourism hub) that also serves as a local transit within Kai Tak. While many parts of Kai Tak were re-planned into public housing, the monorail was eventually cancelled by DevB (R1), but without a transit substitute in place. This was not well received by the other stakeholders:

“When the Development Bureau cancelled the monorail, we can only patch up with the situation with local transit, using the limited roads and the little planning time we had” TranspD (R3).

“The provision of local transit was not yet resolved, and now even the monorail was gone... which really struck a blow to the attractiveness of our properties.” a developer (R5).

The quotes show that the cancellation of the monorail caught the other stakeholders by surprise and undermined their Scopes in which the monorail plays important roles, such as being an intra-district transit for TranspD, and as a supporting amenity for properties for the developer. As the vision of Kai Tak gradually shifted to focus on public housing, the stakeholders seemed

unable to adjust, leading to discrepancies in their visions and real outcomes. The lack of consistent and collectively agreed Scopes is a common remark by many stakeholders, as even agreed by DevB (R1) as the primary driver of the planning process:

“The thing we most fear is when the plan changes constantly and significantly, just like Kai Tak’s which keeps shifting, then in the end we have a ‘four-not-look-alike’* (四不像), far from what anyone wants.”

[*Note: this is a creature in Chinese legend that has body parts from four different animals but looks like none of them.]

Furthermore, while many of the NGOs were interested and devoted to forming visions for Kai Tak, they were seldom realised in the end. Going back to an NGO (R11) “Kai Tak for citizens” proposal, they said:

“We didn’t go against the government’s plan; you can see that the main elements [planned by the government] were still there [in our proposal]. We were simply raising the question of the ratio between public and private housing, whether there was a better vision for Kai Tak to address housing shortage. But the government did not consider any part of our proposal at all.”

This is a sentiment widely shared by the NGOs, though the quote above may be the strongest given the organisation’s efforts in preparing the proposal. Due to their limited participation, there were little chances for the NGOs’ visions for Kai Tak to come to fruition. In general, NGOs and other external stakeholders had rather limited Scopes in Kai Tak’s planning process.

5.2.7 Payoff – Mixed views on exclusively government-built and -managed infrastructure

‘Payoff’ refers to the allocation of costs and benefits, economically and socially. While it could include many topics, a rather common one brought up was the public-private partnership in infrastructure. In HK’s TODs, especially in R+P projects, it is common for some infrastructure (such as parks and footbridges) to be built and maintained by developers for public use (Al-Kodmany *et al.*, 2022)..

Since Kai Tak is not an R+P project, many stakeholders noted the much greater proportion of government-built infrastructure when compared to a typical R+P. One of the benefits mentioned was that such infrastructure can be enjoyed by, and brings better accessibility to, everyone quite equally. For example, PlanD (R7) said:

“For Kai Tak, if you look at the station square, I would say it’s quite a unique design among TODs in HK. The green space connects equally to every plot of development around the station... in terms of urban design, I would say it’s done quite well.”

This view was shared by some, such as the NGOs who recognised that Kai Tak's infrastructure was quite unique in TODs in HK in treating every location equally, being a public square that connects to the whole station neighbourhood instead of developer-built passages that mainly access their development. In this aspect they found that infrastructure in Kai Tak largely benefits the surroundings quite equitably.

Nevertheless, a number of other stakeholders raised issues in this arrangement. For example, a developer and MTR found the government-heavy infrastructure rather unusual and that they could build better infrastructure as in an R+P project. Also, the NGOs also raised concerns on government's management of infrastructure:

“So they [the government] created an open green space for kids, but stepping on the grass is not allowed. How does this work?... In the end, they [the government] just converted some of it to brick-paved surfaces, which I don't think the children enjoy that much” NGO (R12).

This quote is quite reflective of the NGOs' concerns – the government manages the infrastructure rather rigidly. When how residents wanted to use the facilities differ from the government's intention (by stepping on the grass), the government would rather demolish the facility completely (by replacing the grass with bricks) than accommodate an alternative use. This shows the mixed reception of having infrastructure provided only by the government instead of partnering with developers.

6. Discussion – Key issues in Kai Tak's planning process

Our findings revealed some prominent themes in each of the Rules-in-Use. That said, rules operate together as a *configuration* – as Ostrom (2005) indicated, they are not meant to be classified as exclusive components, but useful categories for policy analysis. Institutional rules shape outcomes and policies in conjunction rather than in isolation (Bazzan *et al.*, 2023). Accordingly, by looking at the Rules together, we have synthesised some key issues in the planning process of Kai Tak.

6.1 Dominance and unilateral nature of government actors in the whole process

The first issue is the dominance and unilateral nature of government actors throughout different rules. The government largely dominates in deciding who may participate in Boundary, and government actors (DevB, TranspD, HouseD, PlanD) played the commanding and active roles in Position, with consultants at times having to adjust others' input according to the government's expectations. Likewise, in Authority, Information and Aggregation, the government possessed the main power and control in the exercise of mandates, exchange of information, and decision-making, respectively. Even in Payoff, we saw that most infrastructure was built and managed by the government in Kai Tak, different from other HK TODs with more developer involvement. As summed up by PlanD (R7), “The planning process

is generally government-heavy”. However, such domination of government actors makes it difficult to attain the goals of stakeholder engagement in policy formulation, which Hossinger et al. (2004) identifies as (i) presenting a transparent decision-making process, (ii) absorbing greater input from stakeholders, and (iii) gaining their support and trusts towards the decisions taken.

Firstly, in terms of presenting a transparent decision-making process, we saw from the Aggregation and Information rules that the external stakeholders were often unhappy with the lack of feedback from the TPB, which they considered to operate quite opaquely. Secondly, for absorbing greater input from stakeholders, from the Boundary and Aggregation rules, we found that many of the stakeholders’ chances to participate was highly dependent on the government’s decision. They also felt that the TPB’s composition of government-appointed members was not broadly representative nor democratic in facilitating wider input. For example, NGOs commonly commented that the residents or people they represented did not have the appropriate chance or information to participate. Thirdly, for gaining the support and trusts of stakeholders towards the decisions taken, stakeholders who participated in TPB, from developers to NGOs, generally did not have a positive view of their experiences and doubted the TPB’s value in stakeholder engagement. Such lack of clear feedback and explanation gradually erodes participants’ trust towards the stakeholder engagement mechanism and makes it harder to gain their support in the future (Wagner, 2013). Overall, the dominance of government actors seemed to have hindered stakeholder engagement, which is vital in gaining public understanding, support and legitimacy towards a policy (Cascetta and Pagliara, 2013).

6.2 Imbalances between ‘transit’ and ‘housing development’ stakeholders

The key principle in TOD is the effective integration of ‘transit’ and ‘development’ (Thomas *et al.*, 2018). To implement such a land use and transit integration (LUTI) approach, cooperation between multiple actors in different sectors and at different levels of decision-making is necessary (Jamme *et al.*, 2019). Encouraging population density, employment opportunities and transit provisions are highly inter-dependent and therefore balancing them is important in TOD strategy (Wang *et al.*, 2016).

However, a persistent theme from the Rules analysis was the strong focus placed on housing development at the expense of transit stakeholders. From the discussions of Authority, Aggregation and Scope rules, we saw that HouseD have gradually gained more influence and power, and increasingly saw their vision realised as more public housing were built in Kai Tak. Conversely, TranspD found its work becoming more challenging, often having to yield to housing development in the process. The leading stakeholder, DevB, also noticed this but did little about it. Such imbalances of power between institutional actors belongs to one of the main identified barriers in TOD implementation, namely governance issues (Hrelja *et al.*, 2020). Mu and de Jong (2016) argued that effective implementation of TOD requires government strategies and instruments that promote mutual recognition, goal alignment and smooth cooperation, exactly features that are lacking in Kai Tak. Such divergences in visions and jurisdictions, as well as lack of coordination between institutions, contributes to ineffective

transit infrastructure development (Ahasan *et al.*, 2023). From the other end, challenges in transit provision within a TOD may also originate from tensions within the government in the policy formulation and planning stages (Dorsey and Mulder, 2013).

As such, the imbalanced power between transit and housing development institutional stakeholders posed not only as a process issue, but very possibly also in the outcome of Kai Tak's local transit, as was also mentioned in the remarks from several stakeholders, including PlanD and NGOs. They remarked that Kai Tak's street network designs discouraged through traffic, making it hard to create local bus routes, and with the monorail cancelled (which we would return to in Part 6.4), there weren't much local transit choices other than walking. This could hint at potential issues in the provision of local area transit, which disproportionately affects lower-income residents who are generally more transit-dependent because they have fewer mobility options (such as the option of driving) and time budget available to them (Matsuyuki *et al.*, 2020; Tao *et al.*, 2022), thus constituting a potential outcome justice issue.

However, there is also a counter-argument towards this. Almost all stakeholders recognised housing shortage as one of the greatest challenges HK faces. Therefore, it seems only reasonable to build public housing as quickly as possible, perhaps requiring some compromises such as in transit provision.

6.3 Different set of Rules-in-Use observed by the formal project team and external stakeholders

The third issue is the often greatly different, many times opposing, set of Rules-in-Use observed by the formal project team and the external stakeholders, which hindered effective access and participation of the latter in the planning process.

The formal project team did not identify particular issues in interacting with external stakeholders, seeing themselves playing the leading Positions as “a natural order” (R1), making Information more transparent and accessible, and engaging external stakeholders through the existing mechanism of TPB.

However, external stakeholders (including LegCo member, developers, MTR, and NGOs) painted a very different picture. With the Boundary largely drawn by the government (in the formal project team), they largely played passive and reactive roles, as seen in Position rules. This is case even for the LegCo member, which is noteworthy because the Legislative Council is the formal legislative institution of HK to discharge parliamentary duties. However, he/she still found that the government did not give enough time for him/her to consider proposals, and bundled proposals together to quicken their passage. For the other external stakeholders, findings in Authority, Aggregation and Scope suggest that even though they were sometimes able to participate, their exercise of power was difficult, and they had uncertain influence in collective decision-making through the TPB, leading to limited realisation of their Scopes.

In this regard, it seems that the formal project team and the external stakeholders were bound

by and interacting under two distinct set of Rules-in-Use – the former believed the Rules operating as usual with gradual improvements, while the latter found the Rules restrictive and hindering their participation. This goes against the core principle of just urbanism outlined by Marcuse (2011), where everyone should have a right to co-determine how a city they live in develops. The planning process of Kai Tak also seems to fall short of the key elements of communicative and inclusive planning, namely open platforms, wide representation, flat hierarchy, and democratic participation in the spatial planning process (Achmani *et al.*, 2020). In her book discussing just cities, Fainstein (2010) advocated democracy as one of the three criteria of just cities (the other two being equity and diversity). In furtherance of democracy, there should be broad consultations with relevant populations and groups in planning, with advocates representing those who could not participate directly. However, the Rules-in-Use observed by external stakeholders suggest that this was not the case in Kai Tak's planning. The lack of effective procedural elements which facilitate community participation and represent their interests is also a challenge identified in other studies of TOD planning processes (Harrison *et al.*, 2019; Zuñiga and Houston, 2022).

6.4 Inconsistency and ambiguity in many of the Rules-in-Use

Finally, another recurrent theme was the inconsistency and ambiguity in many of the Rules-in-Use. The external stakeholders, especially the NGOs and advocacy groups, felt uncertainties in the Boundary of participation, in their Positions in the planning process, in exercising their Authority, and in decision-making in the Aggregation rules. They suffer from lack of clarity and consistency when attempting to join the planning process, representing an issue in process justice. This is not a unique finding for Kai Tak – in their literature review of urban renewal, Liao and Liu (2023) identified ambiguous public participation to be one of the major barriers in urban regeneration projects (which fits Kai Tak as a new TOD built on old airport grounds), many times offering only superficial or symbolic participation methods that fail to truly absorb voices and suggestions from the public. Often, local participants such as residents and NGOs have not been sufficiently integrated into the public participation mechanism of the planning process (Horelli *et al.*, 2013). Even for places which offer ample possibilities for public participation, like in Bäcklund and Mäntysalo's (2010) study of Finland's five largest cities, they found that the actual purpose of citizens' participation was not clear, and it remained unresolved whether and how the citizens' input were handled and evaluated.

Another prominent inconsistency identified in Kai Tak was its overall goals and vision, which changed substantially and multiple times, as mentioned in the case description. The Information rule highlighted the key issue of inconsistent strategic information. Further still, the Scope rule revealed a victim of the changing vision without sufficient reconciliation and alignment among stakeholders - the monorail. It originated as a tourism feature and was cancelled by DevB when Kai Tak's visions shifted to public housing, though it also (potentially) served as an important local transit option for residents. The relevant stakeholders, such as TranspD, seemed not to have had the chance to adjust to the changing vision in time, and was quite surprised by the monorail's cancellation. However, they weren't able to take up the monorail before the decision to cancel; one of the suggested reasons was to avoid further

delaying the development in Kai Tak after multiple changes already went through. Other stakeholders like developers were also disappointed as the attractiveness of their properties were affected. In its commanding role, DevB observed that the changing visions of Kai Tak led to it absorbing inputs from all parties yet resembled nothing like what they each envisioned or wanted. The overlooked Scope and neglected Authorities of some stakeholders due to Kai Tak's inconsistent visions represents an issue in process justice. This fits with existing literature in identifying a clear spatial vision as essential in transforming policy directions into consistent and desirable outcomes (Westerhof, 2021), as it plays a strong role in plan implementation by supporting coordination between government units and serving as reference points for them to make decisions together (Hersperger *et al.*, 2019).

7. Conclusion

In this paper, we examined process justice in the planning of Kai Tak station TOD by looking at stakeholder interactions through the IAD model's seven Rules-in-Use. From the findings we synthesised four key issues: (i) dominance and unilateral nature of government actors, (ii) imbalances between 'transit' and 'housing development' stakeholders, (iii) different (and often opposing) sets of Rules-in-Use observed by the formal project team and external stakeholders, and (iv) inconsistency and ambiguity in many of the Rules-in-Use. These issues revealed room for improving process justice in Kai Tak, for which we have formulated some recommendations and implications for planning practice.

Firstly, a key opportunity for intervention lies in TPB, the main existing stakeholder engagement mechanism. Specifically, the government could rethink how the TPB could better engage and absorb the input of different stakeholders, with a view to working towards a more participatory planning approach. Since its foundation in 1991, all of TPB's members have always been appointed directly by the head of the HK government (Town Planning Board, 2023). This relatively top-down approach runs against the spirit of participatory planning, which recognizes the value of engaging residents, local stakeholders, and communities in shaping the city together (Horelli *et al.*, 2013). Some interviewees have suggested relevant improvements, such as introducing democratically elected members to the TPB, and holding innovative engagement sessions (e.g. serious games and workshop) that are accessible to wider stakeholders. This could help address the issues of a government-dominated planning process, opposing Rules-in-Use observed by the formal and external stakeholders, and uncertain participation and decision-making of external stakeholders in the planning process.

Another recommendation is for transit and housing development stakeholders to better formulate their working and cooperation mechanisms in future planning processes. Looking back, if transit stakeholders could assume more active roles and make decisions where they possess the expertise, such as supporting the continuation of the monorail (or a suitable substitute), the resultant transit provision within the Kai Tak might have been better. That could be achieved, for example, by having a more strategic government hierarchy where transit and housing development departments could seek guidance and steer from a common oversight

unit that better coordinates their work, an idea also mentioned by DevB. This could help address the issue of imbalance between transit and development actors in the planning process.

Furthermore, in hindsight, a consistent vision for Kai Tak should have been formulated and adhered to. While it can be appreciated that visions should follow the changing socio-economic conditions, when this happens, it is important that the roles and visions of different parties be reconciled and realigned, so that they can effectively contribute to the new visions. Apparently, this didn't happen, such as in the cancelled monorail when Kai Tak's focus changed from commercial and tourism to housing, which led to mismatched expectations and unsatisfactory outcome for some stakeholders. A better formulated vision with effective mechanism for stakeholders to adapt and adjust to changes could help address the issues of imbalanced transit and housing development and ambiguity in Kai Tak's vision.

This paper provides some useful and new insights into the planning process of TOD in HK. Nevertheless, there exist several limitations to the research which in turn inform the agenda for future research.

Firstly, we have focused on the interaction of stakeholders, representing process justice but not the outcome justice component in the analytical framework. While some of the stakeholders interviewed have proactively discussed the outcome of Kai Tak (such as the local street network, transit provision and infrastructure design), a complementary research on the planning outcome, namely the built environment of Kai Tak (such as residents' perception and objective measurements of the 5Ds attributes) would provide further insights on outcome justice. Specifically, it could help us establish whether and how issues in the planning process (directly) translates to corresponding issues in the 5Ds of the built environment.

Secondly, while our examination of the overall Rules-in-Use already yielded substantial insights, we believe certain specific aspects and issues we identified, such as the imbalances and conflicts between transit and housing development stakeholders, could be further analysed using other approaches. For example, Teisman (2000)'s Round Model analyses complex decision-making by dividing up the process into 'rounds', which are stages of important decision-making shaped by the various actors' problem identification, solution formulation and political judgment, rather than strictly defined by time or policy. The Round Model may be used, for example, by zooming further into the detailed process of Kai Tak (or other cases) to analyse how transit and housing development stakeholders interacted that led to their imbalanced power.

Thirdly, no TOD is separate from its broader environment, and this is also true for Kai Tak. Its ever-changing plans were affected by many external factors, such as the court ruling in 2004 essentially banning harbour reclamation, and the 2007 merger of MTR with KCR, another railway operator in HK who originally won the bid to build the metro line running through Kai Tak station. To fully capture these broader attributes, a macro-scale analysis of the evolution of TOD in HK (perhaps waiting also for the first planned NDA TODs to be completed to include them) may provide us with a broader view of the planning and development process of

TODs in response to the changing environment it is situated in.

In closing, this paper revealed that the planning and institutional processes of TOD do warrant examination in response to the concerns on its social equity and justice implications. The issues in process justice of a TOD case discussed in this paper could hopefully serve as cautionary tales to guide future TOD planning towards its original aim of creating equitable and sustainable communities.

- End of main text -

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Sample interview guidelines

(I) TOD in Hong Kong in general

The first part serves as a short introduction and overview of how TOD is implemented in Hong Kong. We may discuss –

- Does the planning and development of Hong Kong follow principles of TOD?
- How is TOD implemented in HK?

One often cited example of TOD in Hong Kong is MTR's "Rail+Property" ("R+P") model.

- How would you describe the model?
- Overall, how would you comment on R+P as an implementation of TOD?

(II) Planning process of Kai Tak

Rules-in-Use	Description	Code
Boundary	Who gets admitted in the process?	BDR
Position	What is the role of the parties in the process?	POS
Authority	What are the decisions that each party is empowered to make?	AUT
Information	What information is shared, and how?	INF
Aggregation	How do the effort and views of different parties add together to guide the project, make decisions, etc.?	AGG
Scope	What are the outcomes that the parties are able to control?	SCO
Payoff	How are costs and benefits allocated?	PAY

This part aims to examine the roles, interactions and cooperations of different stakeholders in the planning process of the Kai Tak station development. We may discuss –

- How would you describe your organisation's participation in the planning process? Was it easy to participate? [BDR]
- What is the role and mandate of your organisation in the planning process? [POS]
- What is the power and influence of your organisation in the planning process? [AUT]
- Who provides the overall strategy and vision of Kai Tak? How did your organisation influence that? [BDR][SCO]
- What are the outcomes of Kai Tak that your organisation was able to contribute to? [SCO]
- What are the role and positions of other stakeholders, such as government departments and agencies, MTR, developers, NGOs, etc. in the planning process? [POS][AUT]
- What decisions does your organisations make in the progress? How does it make those decisions, e.g. collectively with others? [AUT][AGG]

- How are key decisions in the planning process made? Who gets to participate and who has the final say to make these decisions? [AUT][AGG]
- What information does your organisation require and produce in the planning process? Are there difficulties in getting and sharing these information? [INF]
- What are the key costs and benefits allocation in the Kai Tak development? How is the allocation decided? [PAY]
- Reflecting on our discussions just now, how would you comment on the overall planning process of Kai Tak?
- What were the key barriers and difficulties?
- What could be improved, e.g. in terms of stakeholder participation?

(III) Built environment outcome of Kai Tak

This part aims to examine the built environment of Kai Tak via the 5D framework. Let us discuss the 5Ds one by one.

(1) Density

This refers to the density and crowdedness of housing, businesses, and buildings in general.

- How would you describe the density of Kai Tak?
- Do you think its development density is suitable? Why?

(2) Diversity

This refers to the variety of functions and land-uses, including public and private housing; various retail, shops and businesses, and social services and amenities.

- Do you think there is a diverse mix of housing, businesses and services in Kai Tak?
- Would you say market forces largely shape and determine the mix of functions, or is this deliberately encouraged in the design process?
- Going back to the planning and design process we discussed, to what extent do you think it encourages diversity?

(3) Design

A good design means an easy-to-use, comfortable and enjoyable environment (e.g. walking connections and green spaces) for different people, especially for the disadvantaged groups (e.g. older adults and the disabled).

- Using this definition, do you think Kai Tak is well-designed overall?
- To what extent would you say the design of Kai Tak cater to everyone?

(4) Destination Accessibility

This refers to the ease for residents to reach their destinations, both inside the TOD area (e.g. walking to the local park) and elsewhere (e.g. taking the MTR to CBD for work).

- Do you think people in Kai Tak can easily access their destinations?
- Would you say Kai Tak provides a good variety of accessible destinations?
- Is it the same for everyone living in different neighbourhoods of Kai Tak?

(5) Distance to Transit

This refers to the availability and ease to reach different transit options, both for the main mode of the TOD area (MTR) and others (buses, minibuses, etc.)

- Do you think Kai Tak has good access to transit, both the metro and other modes (e.g. buses, minibuses)?
- Do you think that all development in the TOD area has equal access to transit, especially between the higher and lower income groups?

- End -

Codes used in analysing the interview

(I) TOD in Hong Kong in general

The following codes are applied in the first part of the interview, intending to be an introduction to TOD in HK so that interviewees can get acquainted with the concept. It also includes general questions on the implementation of TOD in HK and the R+P model in order to get interviewees thinking about TOD for the discussion of Kai Tak later. Overall, interviewees were all quite familiar with the term TOD, and had different interpretations and understandings of it as reflected in the codes. This part of the interview serves more as background material that form the foundations of the key findings later.

Code Group	Code	Inductive (from data)	Deductive (from literature)
1 TOD in HK	1.1 HK follows TOD		
	1.1.1 Railway as backbone	●	
	1.1.2 Multi-modal	●	
	1.1.3 Dense development	●	
	1.1.4 Self-sufficient community	●	
	1.1.5 Walkable neighbourhood	●	
	1.1.6 Public transport modal share	●	
	1.1.7 Diverse land use functions	●	
	1.1.8 Transport as prerequisite for development		●
	1.2 HK does not follow TOD		
	1.2.1 Transport follows development	●	
	1.2.2 Slow public transport expansion		●
	1.2.3 Transport proximate development	●	
	1.2.4 Little dedicated urban planning in earlier days		●
	1.2.5 Only focuses on station-top development		●
	1.2.6 Housing as top priority		●
	1.2.7 T and D done in many stages		●
	1.2.8 Development lags behind transport	●	
	1.2.9 Ignores transport social benefits	●	
	1.2.10 Transit operates independently on commercial basis	●	
	1.2.11 Transit capacity often exceeded/insufficient	●	
	1.3 What is TOD in HK		
	1.3.1 MTR's Railway+Property (R+P)		●
	1.3.2 Self-sufficient new towns		●
	1.3.3 Development support transport	●	
	1.3.4 Enabler of housing development	●	
	1.3.5 Transport infrastructure first	●	
	1.3.6 Possible shift from private housing only to public housing R+P	●	
	1.3.7 Creates resilience in transport capacity	●	
	1.3.8 Enhances the areas accessibility		●

Code Group	Code	Inductive (from data)	Deductive (from literature)
	1.3.9 Just another way to sell land for profit	●	
2 MTR's R+P	2.1 MTR's R+P: Description		
	2.1.1 R+P as financing model	●	●
	2.1.2 R+P as TOD		●
	2.1.3 R+P as development model		●
	2.1.4 R+P as community project		●
	2.1.5 R+P is uniquely HK		●
	2.2 MTR's R+P: Positive		
	2.2.1 Facilitate neighbourhood development		●
	2.2.2 Ensure metro passenger volume		●
	2.2.3 Capture land value		●
	2.2.4 Reduce public investment required		●
	2.2.5 Ensure sufficient transport provision		●
	2.2.6 Profitable and financially sustainable		●
	2.2.7 Unlocks development potential	●	
	2.2.8 Efficient use of land and space	●	
	2.2.9 MTR has the most experience and capital to run TOD	●	
	2.3 MTR's R+P: Negative		
	2.3.1 Overlook road transport modes	●	
	2.3.2 Raise property prices		●
	2.3.3 Over-reliance on metro	●	
	2.3.4 Poor growth & connection of neighbourhood	●	
	2.3.5 R+P may not be attractive to MTR	●	
	2.3.6 Not always feasible due to many dependent factors		●
	2.3.7 Only for-profit private housing built	●	
	2.3.8 Only as a money-making tool, neglecting quality of properties	●	
	2.3.9 Difficult/confusing to navigate, poor wayfinding	●	

(II) Planning process of Kai Tak

The following codes are applied in the second part, which forms of the core of the interview. The overall definition of each of the seven Rules-in-Use are explained to the interviewees, and then the discussions are guided by a few relevant prompts, as well as by the topics and ideas brought by the interviewees themselves under each of the Rules. These codes form the key findings in understanding the stakeholder interaction via the Rules-in-Use.

Code Group	Code	Inductive (from data)	Deductive (from literature)
3 Boundary	3.1 Nature of Boundary		
	3.1.1 Pre-determined boundary		●
	3.1.2 Established by convention/law		●
	3.1.3 Responsive boundary that admits	●	

Code Group	Code	Inductive (from data)	Deductive (from literature)
	3.2 Effect of Boundary		
	3.2.1 Cannot join the planning process		●
	3.2.2 No idea how to join		●
	3.2.3 Inconsistent, ad-hoc admittance	●	●
	3.2.4 Unclear, fuzzy boundary	●	●
	3.2.5 Flexible, responsive boundary	●	
	3.2.6 Admitted too late	●	
	3.2.7 Tightening of boundary		●
	3.2.8 Boundary unilaterally decided		●
4 Position	4.1 Ordinary Participant	●	
	4.2 Passive Role		●
	4.3 Indifferent Role	●	
	4.4 Receiver Role	●	
	4.5 Token Role		●
	4.6 No Role	●	
	4.7 Driver and leader	●	
	4.8 Active role		●
	4.9 Unclear or uncertain roles		●
	4.10 Bridge between stakeholders		●
	4.11 Advice giver	●	
	4.12 Create one's own position	●	
	4.13 Appointed/given role	●	
	4.14 Inviter of others to join together	●	
5 Authority	5.1 Definition and exercise of authority		
	5.1.1 Well-defined		●
	5.1.2 Unclear or inconsistent		●
	5.1.3 Limited	●	
	5.1.4 Careful use of authority	●	
	5.2 Nature of authority		
	5.2.2 Discrepancy between stated and actual authority	●	●
	5.2.3 For information only, outside the process	●	
	5.2.4 Voicing views / advocacy / public campaign only		●
	5.2.5 Reactive actions when invited only	●	
6 Information	6.1 Held and shared only within the government		
	6.1.1 Produced for government use only		●
	6.1.2 Premature for public consumption	●	
	6.1.3 To protect and shield certain stakeholders	●	
	6.1.4 To limit participation of certain stakeholders		●
	6.2 Information is sensitive		
	6.2.1 Commercial decisions and secrets		●
	6.2.2 Disclosure could lead to unfair advantage	●	
	6.2.3 Not necessary/difficult for public knowledge	●	
	6.3 Challenges to get information		
	6.3.1 Information is withheld or denied	●	●

Code Group	Code	Inductive (from data)	Deductive (from literature)
	6.3.2 Information is piecemeal		●
	6.3.3 Information is given too late	●	
	6.3.4 Information is difficult to understand		●
	6.3.5 Uncertain where to look	●	
	6.3.6 Strategic information missing	●	●
	6.3.7 Information is crude/fine information is missing	●	●
	6.3.7 Rely on key people to collect information		●
	6.4 Able to get information		
	6.4.1 Easy to get information for government project	●	
	6.4.2 Information obtainable but need to be kept confidential	●	
	6.4.3 Most information will go public anyway	●	
	6.4.4 Information is effectively shared and exchanged	●	
	6.4.5 Gradually became more familiar with finding information		●
	6.4.6 Attempt to make information more interesting and accessible		●
7 Aggregation	7.1 Conflict and Opposition		
	7.1.1 Natural Order	●	
	7.1.2 Organisational Inertia		●
	7.1.3 Self-interest		●
	7.1.4 Overruling power and pressure		●
	7.1.5 Need urging to be heard	●	
	7.1.6 Opposing view heard	●	
	7.2 Collaborative		
	7.2.1 Collaborative		●
	7.2.2 Cooperative		●
	7.2.3 Compromise		●
	7.2.4 Consultative		●
	7.2.5 Work together under specific conditions	●	
	7.2.6 Set clear deadlines and give input and decide	●	
	7.3 Unilateral		
	7.3.1 Not valued		●
	7.3.2 Dependent on others	●	
	7.3.3 Makes decision by self	●	
	7.3.4 Works together only when wanted	●	
	7.3.5 Limited or lack of cooperation		●
8 Scope	8.1 Definition and clarity of scope		
	8.1.1 Unclear or inconsistent scope		●
	8.1.2 Clearly-defined scope		●
	8.1.3 Changing scope		●
	8.1.4 Fragmented scope		●
	8.2 Pursuit and realisation of scopes		
	8.2.1 Focused pursuit of one's scope		●
	8.2.2 Collaborative pursuit of common scopes		●
	8.2.3 Others' scope is better realised	●	
	8.2.4 Dominated by one stakeholder		●

Code Group	Code	Inductive (from data)	Deductive (from literature)
	8.2.5 Mismatch between scopes (and reality)		●
	8.2.6 Bridge between scopes	●	
	8.2.7 Gatekeeper of other's scope		●
	8.2.8 Scope is ignored/overlooked	●	
	8.2.9 Upper level guidance to pursue collective scope	●	
	8.2.10 Users' vs designers'/planners' scopes		●
	8.2.11 Realisation of scope is slow/delayed		●
9 Payoff	9.1 Costs		
	9.1.1 Public-private partnership in infrastructure	●	●
	9.1.3 Shift some infrastructure cost to private sector		●
	9.1.4 High land price policy		●
	9.1.5 Dominance of market mechanism		●
	9.1.6 Developer-built infrastructure still funded by public	●	
	9.2 Benefits		
	9.2.1 Funnelling benefits to select stakeholders	●	
	9.2.2 Synergistic effects		●
	9.2.3 Facilities and infrastructure enjoyed equally	●	
	9.2.4 Restricted societal benefits	●	
	9.2.5 Improved and quicker public housing stock	●	●
	9.2.6 Capture and improve land values	●	

(III) Built environment outcome of Kai Tak

The following codes are applied in the third part of the interview relating to the built environment outcome of Kai Tak. Discussion is guided by the 5Ds of the built environment. Since this is not the focus of the analysis, the discussions were briefer and mostly led by the interviewees in accordance with what they think significant to discuss under each of the 5Ds

Code Group	Code	Inductive (from data)	Deductive (from literature)
10 Density	11.1 As dense as possible		●
	11.2 Dependent on existing development/surroundings/geography		●
	11.3 Efficient use of land		●
	11.4 Government specified plot ratio		●
	11.5 Hong Kong is uniformly dense		●
	11.6 Housing as the most important target		●
	11.7 Land scarcity		●
	11.8 Old districts are denser due to limited planning		●
	11.9 Density as response to market demands	●	●
	11.10 Sacrifice other factors and considerations for density	●	
11 Diversity	11.1 Diversity as an important aim		●
	11.2 Affordable housing requirements on private development		●
	11.3 Current diversity is a "natural result"	●	

	11.4 Diversity of shops and businesses		●
	11.5 Dominated by private housing and malls	●	●
	11.6 facilities and amenities provided by developers as required by lease conditions		●
	11.7 Good diversity of different groups of residents	●	
	11.8 Important for self sufficiency		●
	11.9 Plays no role in fostering diversity	●	
	11.10 Public housing enables diverse facilities and amenities	●	
	11.11 Diversity sacrificed to housing	●	
	11.12 Shops and services are market driven		●
	11.13 Diversity requirements are specified in Guidelines		●
12 Design	12.1 Actively provided by the government		●
	12.2 Checklist affair: provide as per specified	●	
	12.3 Entrusted to the developers/owners		●
	12.4 Essential component in new development		●
	12.5 Facilities for needy groups specified in guidelines		●
	12.6 Parking spaces for cars also important component of TOD	●	
	12.7 Kai Tak station square/park a unique design	●	
	12.8 Strange design without clear rationale	●	
	12.9 Design requirements to be made more systematic and comprehensive in the future	●	
	12.10 Design is an essential component in the planning process		●
13 Destination Accessibility	13.1 Accessible destinations provided well	●	
	13.2 Destinations and connections specified in guidelines		●
	13.3 Depends on existing connections/networks	●	
	13.4 Destinations for lower income residents limited	●	
	13.5 Facilities not accessible due to developers' design	●	●
	13.5 Further connections from the TOD station also important	●	
	13.6 Important to specify early in planning/land grant	●	
	13.7 Innovative connections: People movers, personal transport		●
	13.8 Interconnected local area around TOD		●
	13.9 Open spaces as connections to destinations		●
	13.10 Poor integration of accessibility and connections	●	
	13.11 Walkability is an important consideration		●
	13.12 Lack of attention on intra-district destinations	●	
	13.14 Local destination as specified in guidelines		●
	13.15 Self-sufficiency as objective		●
14 Distance to Transit	14.1 Access to metro determines property prices		●
	14.2 Connections to metro station are important		●
	14.3 Different options to access metro station	●	●
	14.4 Environmentally Friendly Linkage System (i.e. the monorail)	●	●
	14.5 Focused on accessing metro station	●	
	14.6 Footbridge to metro station	●	
	14.7 Highly valued by residents		●
	14.8 Transit important for reaching destinations beyond TOD	●	
	14.9 Local road transport has lower priority/connects less well/integrated poorly	●	

	14.10 Local transit hard to design/provide	●	
	14.11 Metro station complex separate from the rest of neighbourhood		●
	14.12 Mobility for ageing population		●
	14.13 Public Transport Interchange		●
	14.14 Walkway connections differ in quality	●	

- End -