


Inquiry into the National Road Safety Strategy 2011-2020 and beyond

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


A Massive Problem

- Continual drip feed of trauma with no end in sight
- The epidemic is still hidden
 - A crisis of complacency exists
- The tsunami of death and injury yet to come
- We are penalising our future generations (victims, families, communities, the nation)

National Road Safety Strategy 2011-2020

- Signed off by from Ministers from all jurisdictions including the Federal Transport Minister and Secretary for Infrastructure and Transport
- Enshrined in the Safe System approach
- Criticised for not having enough ambition
- Harm elimination was contentious



Some Australian RS Context



- Australia has a federated system
 - **Commonwealth**: infrastructure funding, vehicle standards, telecommunications, health
 - **States / Territories (8)**: bulk of the implementation task including road agencies, licencing and registration, police, health, (insurance), commissions
 - **Local Government**: extensive road networks, grass roots community support
 - Regulators, commissions, national organisations sit over the top usually with state road agency oversight

Inquiry Background

- Independent inquiry announced on 8 September 2017 by then Federal Transport **Minister Darren Chester**
 - Lift in fatalities in 2015/16
 - Apparent that NRSS targets not likely to be met
- Background of lobbying provided by AAA

Co-Chairs



A/Prof Jeremy Woolley

- Director, Centre for Automotive Safety Research (CASR), The University of Adelaide
- SA Chair and National Secretary, ACRS



Dr John Crozier

- Royal Australasian College of Surgeons (RACS)
- Chair National Trauma Committee

Advisors



Lauchlan McIntosh AM

- President, Australasian College of Road Safety (ACRS)
- Chair, Global New Car Assessment Program (GNCAP)



Robert McInerney

- CEO International Road Assessment Program (iRAP)

Terms of Reference (Summary)

1. Reason for uplift in fatalities and injuries (2015 and 2016)
2. Effectiveness of current NRSS and 2015/17 Action Plan
3. Issues and priorities for consideration in development of a post-2020 NRSS and action plan which minimises harm to all users.
4. Advise on arrangements for the management of road safety and the NRSS, looking at best coordination and use of the capacity and contributions of all partners.

Consultative Process

- Over a period of 12 months:
 - Public and private submissions
 - Interviews with key stakeholders and stakeholder organisations
 - A series of forums and workshops
 - All over Australia

Public Release

- 12 September 2018 at Parliament House
 - Launched by the Deputy Prime Minister, Michael McCormack
 - Non-partisan event: both sides of politics resolved to work together
 - Video available on YouTube:
Inquiry into the Effectiveness of the NRSS Report - Launch Event - Parliament House, Canberra

Inquiry Report

- Report available at DIRD, CASR, RACS, ACRS, AAA:

<http://roadsafety.gov.au/nrss/inquiry.aspx>

- Search for: *DIRD road safety inquiry*



Important Note

- Road safety is complex
- Many people are doing good work nudging organisations and the community in the right direction
- The report should not be seen as an attack on past successes or individuals
- However the inquiry highlights that many of these hard fought victories are small in scale relative to the overall size of the problem

Important Note

- The Inquiry necessarily maintains a high level focus on strategic leadership and management
 - Many may be disappointed it is not prescriptive regarding countermeasures
 - Many may be disappointed it does not solve the issues associated with Federalism
- The findings however point to a climate necessary for national success

The Australian Problem

- Legacy of system not well suited to human operation and not survivable
- Plateau in fatality trend (~1200)
- Increases in injury data (at least 36,000 ???)
- > \$30b annual problem to the nation
- Data is poor at informing us of core issues
- We struggle to engage in injury management
- Poor links between costs and benefits results in gross under-funding
- **A lack of perspective on the disaster heading our way**
 - A drip feed with no end in sight
 - 10 yrs: 12,000 killed and >360,000 admitted at \$300b drag to economy

Lack of a Harm Elimination Agenda

- Very little leadership on this agenda is evident
- Safe System, Vision Zero, Towards Zero, Zero:
 - Zero no longer a *dirty word*
- A crisis of complacency exists:
 - “*doing as much as we can with what we have got*”
 - Safer is good enough, we do not pursue SAFE outright
 - We need to move from coping to fixing the system

Implementation Failure

- There has been a failure to implement the Safe System approach
- **Change management** has not received sufficient attention and cultural resistance remains high
- There is an inability to implement and pursue many of the actions under the NRSS (lack of capacity and resource)
- Ill-defined actions do not paint a picture of what success looks like and worse, results in unrealistic expectations:
 - Enforcement (general or specific deterrence?)
 - Local Government Infrastructure

Implementation Failure

- Resource, talent, capacity, processes needed to achieve zero have not been adequately identified and established
- Tools, frameworks and Quality Assurance are largely absent
- “**Mainstreaming**” of safety has not occurred
 - Safety still traded off against competing demands
 - Historical perspectives remain entrenched

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

- 80% of the road network
- 50% of casualty crashes
- Very limited capacity (talent, funds, strategy) to pursue the agenda
- Why then should we expect a performance boost?

Stimulus and Scale

- Necessary for the desired step change
- Response at a scale that can make a difference
- Provide assistance where it is needed (capacity building, cooperation and coordination, “flying” squads for LGA engineers)
- Ensure sustainability of efforts
- Magnify the effect with broader stakeholder adoption

Getting the House in Order

- Move from fatality management to injury management
- National data reporting issues
- Serious injury definition and reporting
- Data linkage and reporting
- Metrics that measure outputs against inputs

Getting the House in Order

- Understand how the network is being made more **survivable** (energy mgt) and **error tolerant**?
- More focus on **human-centric** design and operation
- Better understand the scenarios that get the system to **ZERO** in a given timeframe
- A **30 year timeframe** for next strategy is more realistic
 - Interim targets should also aim for zero in parts of the system (2030, 2040)

Getting the House in Order

- Agility
 - There is none
 - Risk aversity rather than risk management
 - (mis)-perceptions about legal liability
- Innovation
 - When was the last time we failed at something?
- Successes
 - There are good news stories on harm reduction that we can promote

Getting the House in Order

- Road safety needs to become part of the national economic discussion
 - Infrastructure Australia
 - Safety is the often assumed by-product after trading off
- Stop perpetuating problems for the future
 - eg rolling 5 year performance review of new projects

Overlooked cost of delays (p55)

2009 - Petrol tanker crash on the Pacific Highway

2011 - NSW Deputy State Coroner recommended that all vehicles in Australia used to transport dangerous goods be fitted with Stability Control (SC)

2013 – No action until a second petrol tanker crash on Mona Vale Road in Sydney

2014 – NSW Environmental Protection Authority required that all dangerous goods tanker trailers used in NSW and built after 1 July 2014 be fitted with SC.

(2019) - All dangerous goods tanker trailers used in NSW after 1 January 2019 be fitted with SC.

Efforts to secure a national agreement on this approach were not successful.

2017 – Aust Govt DIRD issued a consultation regulatory impact statement (RIS) on mandating stability control for some categories of new trucks and trailers

Consultation RIS recommended Prime Movers >12t and Trailers > 10t assessed as delivering the highest net economic benefit (based on guidelines issued by the Australian Government Office of Best Practice Regulation)

Industry was calling for a broader approach to include rigid trucks as well

2018 - The Australian Government promulgated the rule and extended the mandatory requirements slightly to cover short wheelbase rigid trucks that could be converted to prime movers or truck and dog combinations

The regulated implementation timetable is:

2019 - For medium and heavy trailers (ADR category TC and TD vehicles): 1 July 2019 for new models and 1 November 2019 for all new vehicles.

2020 and **2022** - For heavy trucks and buses (ADR category NC and ME vehicles): 1 November 2020 for new models and 1 January 2022 for all new vehicles.

The positive net benefits of this intervention over the business as usual case are conservatively estimated at **\$217 million** with the potential to save **126 lives** and see a reduction of **1101 serious injuries** over the RIS 44 year term. **This is 28 killed and seriously injured a year.** Had regulators acted immediately on the NSW Deputy Coroner's recommendation and applied the current policy approach, **it seems likely that more than 200 deaths and serious injuries could have been avoided.**

Vehicles

- **Agility is required!**
- The complexity is acknowledged however the stakes are high
- Government can better align the regulatory regime with safety
- Who looks at trauma cost as a result of slow ADR processes or gaps not covered by the eventual regulation?
- Putting industry on notice regarding next ADR – where is the Australian aspiration?
- Luxury car tax reform (safety features creep)
- Can processes be on top of vehicles being “dumbed down”
- Capacity to make decisions and influence new technologies
 - We are already suffering from a “following” mindset and are ill-prepared for future opportunities
- Regulatory vs Non-regulatory – who has the big picture?
 - ANCAP scope can and should be more
 - Can others fill the gaps?
- Incident investigation and data sharing

Autonomous Vehicles

- Marketed as being our salvation
- Much uncertainty about future scenarios
- We lack the **agility** to manage the **transition**
- Setting ourselves up for failure with unrealistic expectations
- We risk missing the opportunity to **maximise benefits** from other life saving ADAS over next 30 years
- **Redundancy** still required
- AVs must be able to read the roads

Recommendations

1. Appointing a **Cabinet minister with specific multi-agency responsibility** to address the hidden epidemic of road trauma including its impact on the health system.
2. Establish a **national road safety entity** reporting to the Cabinet minister with responsibility for road safety.
3. Commit to a minimum **\$3 billion a year road safety fund**.

Recommendations

4. Target of **Zero for 2050**; interim target Zero for all major capital city CBD areas, and high-volume highways by **2030**.
5. Establish and commit to key performance indicators in time for the next strategy that **measure and report how harm can be eliminated in the system**, and that are published annually.
6. Undertake a National Road Safety **Governance Review** by March 2019.

Recommendations

7. Implement **rapid deployment and accelerated uptake** of proven vehicle safety technologies and innovation.
8. **Accelerate the adoption of speed management initiatives** that support harm elimination.
9. Invest in road safety focused infrastructure, safe system and mobility **partnerships** with state, territory and local governments that **accelerate the elimination of high-risk roads**.

Recommendations

10. Make road safety a **genuine part of business as usual** within Commonwealth, state, territory and local government.
11. Resource key road safety **enablers** and road safety **innovation** initiatives.
12. Implement **life-saving partnerships with countries** in the Indo-Pacific and globally as appropriate to reduce road trauma.

Closing Reflections

Inconvenient Truths

- The road system is not fit for purpose
- Costs and benefits accrue in different areas
- Economic assessments do not contextualise getting to zero
- Safety still treated as a by-product of productivity and personal mobility
- There will still be an injury residual associated with new vehicle safety technologies

Safe System - Contentious Issues

- Defaulting to principles and community values
- Achieving zero harm
- If road users fail to cooperate, system operators and designers must intervene
- Zero harm is not affordable

Reflections 1

- Demonstrations are needed
- Targets that include parts of the system achieving zero
- Celebrate your successes
 - Ribbon cutting for the elimination of harm for certain crash types along a corridor?
- Decision making in the context of zero harm

Reflections 2

Safe system:

An enabler

or

Game changer?



Catch phrases and headlines

- SAFE not safer
- From coping to fixing
- Organising ourselves for the future disaster
- Implementation failure
- Stimulus and Scale
- Leadership on a harm elimination agenda
- Leadership on systemic change

Rookie errors to look out for

- Victim blaming
- A pretence that safety is a priority then trading it off against everything else
- Not mainstreaming the harm elimination agenda
- Focus on the gains rather than the ongoing loss
- Focus on fatalities instead of the injuries
- Assume that safety is adequately taken care of with current processes
- Ask about consequence: *how are we mitigating harm for those who will be involved in a crash?*

Strategy 101

- Road safety Strategic decision making:
 - Inadequate gap analysis (talent, resource, capacity, timeframe; contribution from roads / vehicles / speed / post-crash / enforcement)
 - Inappropriate KPIs (survivability and error tolerance)
 - Achieving zero at a point in time
 - Leadership on systemic change / step change
 - Longer term time frames required

Can we protect future generations?

